

Humane Nature :
O R
The Fundamental Elements
O F
POLICY.
B E I N G
A Discovery of the *Faculties*
Acts and *Passions* of the
S O U L of M A N,
From their Original causes;
According to such
Philosophical Principles
As are not commonly known or asserted.

The *Third Edition*, Augmented and much
corrected by the Authors own hand.

By *Tho. Hobbs* of *Malmsbury*.

LONDON, Printed for *Matthew Gilliflower*,
Henry Rogers, and *Tho. Fox*, Booksellers in *Westminster-*
Hall. MDCLXXXIV.

Revised Edition:

OF

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The Fifth Edition, Abridged and enlarged

corrected by the Author's Son.

By The Author of *Mind*.

LONDON, Printed for Andrew Gillman,

in the Strand, and for Booksellers in general.

MDCCLXXIV.



To the Right Honourable,

WILLIAM
EARL OF
NEW-CASTLE,

Governour to the Prince his Highness,
One of His Majesties Most Honourable
Privy Council.

My most Honour'd Lord,

FROM the principal parts of
Nature, Reason and Passi-
on, have proceeded two
kinds of Learning, Mathe-
matical and Dogmatical: the former is

The Epistle Dedicatory.

free from Controversie and Dispute, because it consisteth in comparing Figure and Motion only; in which things, Truth, and the Interest of Men, oppose not each other: but in the other there is nothing undisputable, because it compareth Men, and medleth with their Right and Profit; in which, as oft as Reason is against a Man, so oft will a Man be against Reason. And from hence it cometh, that they who have written of Justice and Policy in General, do all invade each other and themselves with Contradictions. To reduce this Doctrine to the Rules and Infallibility of Reason, there is no way but, first, put such Principles down for a Foundation, as Passion, not mistrusting, may not seek to displace; and afterwards to build

301 A

The Epistle Dedicatory.

build. thereon the Truth of Cases in
the Law of Nature (which hitherto
have been built in the Air) by
degrees, till the whole have been
inexpugnable. Now, my Lord,
the Principles fit for such a Foundation,
are those which heretofore
I have acquainted your Lordship
withal in private Discourse, and
which by your Command I have
here put into a Method. To examine
Cases thereby between Sovereign
and Sovereign, or between Sovereign
and Subject, I leave to them
that shall find Leisure and Encouragement
thereto. For my part, I
present this to your Lordship for the
true and only Foundation of such
Science. For the Stile, it is therefore
the worse, because, whilst I
was writing, I consulted more with
Logick than with Rhetorick: But
for

The Epistle Dedicatory.

for the Doctrine, it is not slightly proved ; and the Conclusions thereof of such Nature , as , for want of them , Government and Peace have been nothing else , to this day , but mutual Fears : And it would be an incomparable benefit to Commonwealth , that every one held the Opinion concerning *Law* and *Policy* here delivered. The ambition therefore of this Book , in seeking by your Lordships countenance to insinuate it self with those whom the matter it containeth most nearly concerneth , is to be excused. For my self , I desire no greater honour than I enjoy already in your Lordship's favour , unless it be that you would be pleased , in Continuance thereof , to give me more Exercise in your commands ; which , as I am bound by your many

ny

The Epistle Dedicatory.

ny great Favours, I shall obey,
being,

My most honoured Lord,

Your most humble,

and most obliged

Servant,

May 9. 1640.

THO. HOBBS.

ol. 1677

I N

The Epistle Dedicatory.

My great Favour, I shall obey,
being

My most honoured Lord,

Your most humble,


and most obliged

Servant,

Wm. A. 1640.

Tho. Hobbes.

IN



I N

Libellum præstantissimi

T H O. H O B B I

**Veri verè Philosophi, de Naturâ
Hominis.**

Qua magna Cœli mœnia, & tracta Maris,
Terræq; fines siquid aut ultra est, capit
Mens ipsa, tandem capitur: Omnia hæc
Que nōsse potuit, nota jam primū est Sibi.

Accede, Lector, disce quis demū sis;
Tranquilinam jecuris agnoscas tui,
Quī propiūs heret nil tibi, & nil tam procul.

Non

*Non hic Scholarum frivola, aut cassi legi,
Quales per annos forte plus septem legit;
Ut folle pleno prodeat, Rixæ Artifex;
Vanæque merces futili lingua crepet:
Sed sancta Rerum pondera, & sensus graves
Quales parari decuit, ipsa cùm fuit
Pingenda Ratio, & vindici suo adstitit.*

*Panduntur omnes Machina gyri tua,
Animæque Vætes, Trochlea, Cunei, Rota;
Quâ concitetur arte, quâ sufflamine
Sistatur illa rursus, & constet sibi:
Nec, si Fenestram pectori humano suam
Apertisset ipse Momus, inspiceret magis.
Hic cerno levia Affectuum vestigia,
Gracilesque Sensus lineas; video quibus
Vehantur alis blanduli Cupidines,
Quilisque stimulis argenti. Ira graves.
Hic & Dolores, & Voluptates suos
Produnt recessus; ipse nec Timor latet.*

*Has nôrit artes quisquis in foro velit
Animarum habentem flectere, & populos caput
Aptis ligatos nexibus jungi sibi.
Hic Archimedes publicis figit pedem,
Siquando regna machinis politicis
Urgere satagit, & feras gentes ciet,
Imisque arduis sedibus mandatum quatit:
Facile domabit cuncta, qui Menti imperat.*

*Consultor audax, & Promethei potens
Facinoris Anime! quis tibi dedit Deus
Hæc intneri saculis longè abdita,*

Oculosque

*Oculosque luce tinxit ambrosiâ tuos ?
Tu mentis omnis, at Tua nulla est capax.
Hâc laude Solus fructu : Divinum est opus
Animam Creare ; proximum huic, Ostendere.*

RAD. BATHURST, A. M.

Col. Trin. Oxon.

Humane

Oculopne lace tinnit ambrosij tinnit
Te mentis tinnit, in Tine nulla est causa.
Hic lachry Solus fuit: Divinum est esse
Admirans Cereus; primum dicit Offendit.

R. B. BATHURST, A. M.

Col. Tinn. Cereus.

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Humane Nature:

OR THE Fundamental Elements

OF POLICY.

THE true and perspicuous Explication of the Elements of *Laws Natural and Politick* (which is my present Scope) dependeth upon the Knowledge of what is *Humane Nature*, what is *Body Politick*, and what it is we call a *Law*; concerning which Points, as the *Writings* of Men from Antiquity downwards have still increased, so also have the *Doubts* and *Controversies* concerning the same: And seeing that true Knowledge begetteth not Doubt nor Controversie, but Knowledge, it is manifest from the present Controversies, That they which have heretofore writ-

ten thereof, have not well understood their own Subject.

2. *Harm* I can do none, though I err no less than they; for I shall leave Men but as they are, in Doubt and Dispute: but, intending not to take any Principle upon *Trust*, but only to put Men in Mind of what they *know already*, or *may know* by their own Experience, I hope to erre the less; and when I do, it must proceed from too *hasty Concluding*, which I will endeavour as much as I can to avoid.

3. On the other side, if *Reasoning aright* win not *Consent*, which may very easily happen, from them that being confident of their own Knowledge weigh not what is said, the *Fault* is not mine, but theirs; for as it is my Part to *shew* my Reasons, so it is theirs to bring *Attention*.

4. Mans Nature is the *Summ* of his natural *Faculties and Powers*, as the Faculties of *Nutrition, Motion, Generation, Sense, Reason, &c.* These Powers we do unanimously call *Natural*, and are contained in the Definition of Man, under these words, *Animal* and *Rational*.

5. According to the two principal Parts of Man, I divide his Faculties into two sorts, Faculties of the *Body*, and Faculties of the *Mind*.

6. Since the minute and distinct Anatomy of the Powers of the *Body* is nothing necessary to the present Purpose, I will only summ them up in these Three Heads, Power *Nutritive*, Power *Motive*, and Power *Generative*.

7. Of the Powers of the *Mind* there be two Sorts, *Cognitive*, *Imaginative*, or *Conceptive* and *Motive*; and first of *Cognitive*.

For

For the understanding of what I mean by the Power *Cognitive*, we must remember and acknowledge that there be in our Minds continually certain *Images* or Conceptions of the Things without us, insomuch that if a Man could be alive, and all the rest of the World annihilated, he should nevertheless retain the *Image* thereof; and all those Things which he had before seen or perceived in it; every one by his own Experience knowing, that the *Absence* or *Destruction* of things once imagined doth not cause the *Absence* or *Destruction* of the *Imagination* it self; This *Imagery* and *Representations* of the Qualities of the Thing without, is that we call our *Conception*, *Imagination*, *Ideas*, *Notice* or *Knowledge* of them; and the *Faculty* or Power by which we are capable of such Knowledge, is that I here call *Cognitive Power*, or *Conceptive*, the Power of Knowing or Conceiving.

CHAP. II.

2. Definition of Sense.
4. Four Propositions concerning the nature of Conceptions.
5. The First proved.
6. The Second proved.
- 7, 8. The Third proved.
9. The Fourth proved.
10. The main Deception of Sense.

1. **H**AVING declared what I mean by the Word *Conception*, and other Words equivalent thereunto, I come to the *Conceptions* themselves, to shew their *Differences*, their *Causes*, and the *Manner of the Production*, so far as is necessary for this Place.

2. Originally all *Conceptions* proceed from the *Action* of the thing it self, whereof it is the *Conception*: Now when the *Action* is *present*, the *Conception* it produceth is also called *Sense*; and the Thing by whose *Action* the same is produced, is called the *Object of the Sense*.

3 By our several *Organs* we have several *Conceptions* of several *Qualities* in the *Objects*; for by *Sight* we have a *Conception* or *Image* composed of *Colour* and *Figure*, which is all the *Notice* and *Knowledge* the *Object* imparteth to us of its *Nature* by the *Eye*. By *Hearing* we have a *Conception* called *Sound*, which is all the *Knowledge* we have of the *Quality* of the *Object*

ject from the Ear. And so the rest of the Senses are also Conceptions of several Qualities, or Natures of their Objects.

4. Because the *Image* in Vision consisting of *Colour* and *Shape* is the Knowledge we have of the Qualities of the Object of that Sense; it is no hard matter for a Man to fall into this Opinion, that the same *Colour* and *Shape* are the very *Qualities themselves*; And for the same cause, that *Sound* and *Noise* are the *Qualities of the Bell*, or of the *Air*. And this Opinion hath been so long received, that the contrary must needs appear a great Paradox; and yet the Introduction of *Species visibile* and *intelligible* (which is necessary for the Maintenance of that Opinion) passing to and fro from the *Object*, is worse than any Paradox, as being a plain *Impossibility*. I shall therefore endeavour to make plain these Points:

That the Subject wherein *Colour* and *Image* are inherent, is not the *Object* or thing seen.

That there is nothing without us (really) which we call an *Image* or *Colour*.

That the said *Image* or *Colour* is but an apparition unto us of the *Motion*, *Agitation*, or *Alteration*, which the *Object* worketh in the *Brain*, or *Spirits*, or some internal Substance of the Head.

That as in *Vision*, so also in Conceptions that arise from the other Senses, the Subject of their inherence is not the *Object*, but the *Sentient*.

5. Every Man hath so much Experience as to have seen the *Sun* and the other visible Objects by Reflection in the *Water* and *Glasses*; and this alone is sufficient for this Conclusion, that *Colour* and *Image* may be there where the *Thing seen* is *not*. But because it may be said that notwithstanding the *Image* in the *Water* be not in the Object, but a Thing meerly *Phantastical*, yet there may be *Colour* really in the Thing it self: I will urge further this Experience, that divers Times Men see directly the *same* Object *double*; as *two Candles* for *one*, which may happen from Distemper or otherwise without Distemper if a Man will, the Organs being either in their right Temper, or equally distempered, the *Colours* and *Figures* in two such Images of the same Thing *cannot be inherent* therein, because the Thing seen cannot be in *two Places*.

One of these Images therefore is *not inherent* in the Object: but seeing the Organs of the Sight are then in equal Temper or Distemper, the *one* of them is no more inherent than the *other*; and consequently *neither* of them both are in the Object; which is the First Proposition, mentioned in the precedent Number.

6. Secondly, that the Image of any Thing by Reflection in a *Glass* or *Water* or the like, is *not* any Thing *in* or *behind* the *Glass*, or *in* or *under* the *Water*, every Man may grant to himself; which is the Second Proposition.

7. For the Third, we are to consider, First that every great *Agitation* or *Concussion* of the *Brain* (as it happeneth from a *Stroak*, especially if the *Stroak* be upon the *Eye*) whereby the
Optick

Optick Nerve suffereth any great Violence, there appeareth before the Eyes a certain Light, which Light is *nothing without*, but an Apparition only, all that is real being the Concussion or Motion of the Parts of that Nerve, from which Experience we may conclude, That *Apparition of Light is really nothing but Motion within*. If therefore from *lucid Bodies* there can be derived *Motion*, so as to affect the Optick Nerve in such manner as is proper thereunto, there will follow an *Image* of Light somewhere in that Line by which the Motion was last derived to the Eye; That is to say, In the Object, if we look directly on it, and in the Glass or Water, when we look upon it in the Line of Reflection; which in Effect is the Third Proposition; namely, That Image and Colour is but an Apparition to us of that Motion, Agitation, or Alteration which the Object worketh in the Brain or Spirits, or some *internal Substance* in the Head.

8. But that *from all lucid*, shining and illuminate Bodies, there is a *Motion produced* to the Eye, and, through the Eye, to the Optick Nerve, and so into the *Brain*, by which that Apparition of *Light or Colour* is affected, is not hard to prove. And first, it is evident that the *Fire*, the only lucid Body here upon Earth, worketh by *Motion* equally every Way; inso much as the Motion thereof *stopped* or inclosed, it is presently *extinguished*, and no more Fire. And further, that that Motion whereby the Fire worketh, is *Dilation*, and *Contraction* of it self *alternately*, commonly called *Scintillation* or *Glowing*, is manifest also by Experience. From such *Motion* in the Fire

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must

must needs arise a *Rejection* or casting from it self of that part of the *Medium* which is *conjugate* to it; whereby that part also rejecteth the next, and so successively one part beareth back another to the very *Eye*; and in the same manner the *exterior* part of the *Eye* presseth the *interior*; (the Laws of Refraction still observed.) Now the interior coat of the *Eye* is nothing else but a piece of the *Optick Nerve*; and therefore the Motion is still continued thereby into the *Brain*; and by *Resistance* or Reaction of the *Brain*, is also a *Rebound* into the *Optick Nerve* again; which we are conceiving as Motion or Rebound from nothing, do think it is nothing, and call it *Light*; as hath been already shewed by the Experience of a *Stroke*. We have no Reason to doubt, that the Fountain of *Light*, the *Sun*, worketh by any other Ways than the *Fine*, at least in this Matter. And thus all *Vision* hath its Original from such Motion as is here described: for where there is no *Light*, there is no *Sight*; and therefore *Colour* also must be the same Thing with *Light*, as being the Effect of the lucid Bodies: their Difference being only this, that when the *Light* cometh directly from the Fountain to the *Eye*, or indirectly by Reflection from clean and polite Bodies, and such as have not any particular Motion internal to alter it, we call it *Light*; but when it cometh to the *Eye* by Reflection from *unsmooth*, rough, and coarse Bodies, (or such as are affected with internal Motion of their own that may alter it) then we call it *Colour*; *Colour* and *Light* differing only in this, that the one is pure, and the

the other ~~perceived~~ Light. By that which hath been said, not only the Truth of the Third Proposition, but also the whole Manner of producing Light and Colour, is apparent.

9. As Colour is not inherent in the Object, but an Effect thereof upon us, caused by such Motion in the Object, as hath been described: so neither is ~~Sound~~ in the Thing we hear, but in our selves. One manifest Sign thereof, is, that as a Man may see, so also he may hear double or treble, by Multiplication of Echoes, which Echoes are Sounds as well as the Original; and not being in one and the same Place, cannot be inherent in the Body that maketh them. Nothing can make any Thing which is not in it self: the Clapper hath no Sound in it, but Motion, and maketh Motion in the internal Parts of the Bell; so the Bell hath Motion, and not Sound, that imparteth Motion to the Air; and the Air hath Motion, but not Sound; the Air imparteth Motion by the Ear and Nerve unto the Brain; and the Brain hath Motion, but not Sound: from the Brain, it reboundeth back into the Nerves outward, and thence it becometh an Apparition without, which we call Sound. And to proceed to the rest of the Senses, it is apparent enough, that the Smell and Taste of the same Thing, are not the same to every Man; and therefore are not in the Thing smelt or tasted, but in the Men. So likewise the Heat we feel from the Fire is manifestly in us; and is quite different from the Heat which is in the Fire: for our Heat is Pleasure or Pain, according as it is great or moderate; but in the Coal there is no such

such Thing. By this the Fourth and last Proposition is proved, *viz.* That as in Vision, so also in Conceptions that arise from *other* Senses, the Subject of their Inherence is not in the Object, but in the Sentient.

10. And from hence also it followeth, that *whatsoever* Accidents or Qualities our Senses make us think there be in the *World*, they be *not* there, but are *Seeming* and *Apparitions* only: the Things that really *are* in the World without us, are those *Motions* by which these Seemings are caused. And this is the *great Deception of Sense*, which also is to be by Sense *corrected*: for as Sense telleth me, when I see *directly*, that the Colour seemeth to be in the Object; so also Sense telleth me, when I see by *Reflection*, that Colour is in the Object.

CHAP.

C H A P. III.

1. *Imagination defined.*
2. *Sleep and Dreams defined.*
3. *Causes of Dreams.*
4. *Fiction defined.*
5. *Phantasms defined.*
6. *Remembrances defined.*
7. *Wherein Remembrance consisteth.*
8. *Why in a Dream a Man never thinks he dreams.*
9. *Why few Things seem strange in Dreams.*
10. *That a Dream may be taken for Reality and Vision.*

1. **A**S standing Water put into Motion by the Stroak of a *Stone*, or blast of *Wind*, doth not presently give over moving as soon as the *Wind* ceaseth, or the *Stone* setleth: so neither doth the *Effect* cease which the *Object* hath wrought upon the *Brain*, so soon as ever, by turning aside of the *Organs* the *Object* ceaseth to work; that is to say, Though the *Sense* be past, the *Image* or *Conception* remaineth; but more obscure while we are awake, because some *Object* or other continually plieth and solliciteth our *Eyes*, and *Ears*, keeping the *Mind* in a stronger Motion, whereby the weaker doth not easily appear. And this obscure *Conception* is that we call *Phantasie*, or *Imagination*: *Imagination* being (to define it) *Conception remaining,*

maining, and by little and little decaying from and after the Act of Sense.

2. But when present Sense is not, as in Sleep, there the Images remaining after Sense (when there be many) as in Dreams, are not obscure, but strong and clear, as in Sense it self. The Reason is, That which obscured and made the Conceptions weak, namely Sense, and present Operation of the Object, is removed: for Sleep is the Privation of the Act of Sense, (the Power remaining) and Dreams are the Imagination of them that sleep.

3. The Causes of Dreams (if they be natural) are the Actions or Violence of the inward Parts of a man upon his Brain, by which the Passages of Sense by Sleep benumbed, are restored to their Motion. The Signs by which this appeareth to be so, are the Differences of Dreams (old Men commonly dream oftener, and have their Dreams more painful than young) proceeding from the different Accidents of Mans Body; as Dreams of Lust, as Dreams of Anger, according as the Heart, or other Parts within, work more or less upon the Brain, by more or less Heat; so also the Descents of different sorts of Flegm maketh us a Dream of different Tastes of Meats and Drinks; and I believe there is a Reciprocation of Motion from the Brain to the Vital Parts, and back from the Vital Parts to the Brain; whereby not only Imagination begetteth Motion in those Parts; but also Motion in those Parts begetteth Imagination like to that by which it was begotten. If this be true, and that said Imaginations nourish the Spleen, then we see

see also a Cause, why a strong *Spleen* reciprocally causeth *fearful Dreams*, and why the Effects of *Lasciviousness* may in a Dream produce the Image of some person that had caused them. Another Sign that Dreams are caused by the Action of the inward Parts, is the *Disorder* and casual Consequence of one Conception or Image to another: for when we are *waking*, the *Antecedent* thought or Conception introduceth, and is cause of the *Consequent*, (as the Water followeth a mans Finger upon a dry and level Table (but in *Dreams* there is commonly *no Coherence*, (and when there is, it is by Chance) which must needs proceed from this, That the *Brain* in Dreams is *not restored* to its Motion in every Part alike; whereby it cometh to pass, that our Thoughts appear like the Stars between the flying Clouds, not in the Order which a Man would chuse to observe them, but as the uncertain Flight of broken Clouds permits.

4. As when the *Water*, or any liquid Thing moved at once by *divers* Movents, receiveth one Motion compounded of them all; so also the *Brain* or Spirit therein, having been stirred by *divers* Objects, composeth an Imagination of *divers* Conceptions that appeared single to the Sense. As for Example, the Sense sheweth at one Time the Figure of a *Mountain*, and at another Time the Colour of *Gold*; but the Imagination afterwards hath them both at once in a *golden Mountain*. From the same Cause it is, there appear unto us *Castles* in the *Air*, *Chimera's*, and other Monsters which are *not in Rerum Natura*, but have been conceived by the Sense in Pieces

Pieces at several Times. And this Composition is that which we commonly call *Fiction* of the Mind.

5. There is yet another Kind of Imagination, which for *Clearness* contendeth with *Sense*, as well as a *Dream*; and that is, when the *Action* of *Sense* hath been *long* or *vehement*: and the Experience thereof is more frequent in the *Sense* of *Seeing*, than the rest. An Example whereof is, the *Image* remaining before the *Eye* after looking upon the *Sun*. Also, those little Images that appear before the Eyes in the *dark*; whereof I think every Man hath Experience, (but they most of all, who are *timorous* or *superstitious*) are Examples of the same. And these, for Distinction-sake, may be called *Phantasms*.

6. By the *Senses*, which are numbred according to the *Organs* to be *five*, we take Notice (as hath been said already) of the Objects *without* us; and that Notice is our *Conception* thereof: but we take Notice also some Way or other of *our Conceptions*: for when the Conception of the same Thing cometh *again*, we take Notice that is *again*; that is to say, that we have had the same Conception *before*; which is as much as to imagine a Thing *past*; which is impossible to the *Sense*, which is only of Things *present*. This therefore may be accounted a *Sixth Sense*, but *internal*, (not *external*, as the rest) and is commonly called *Remembrance*.

7. For the *Manner* by which we take Notice of a Conception *past*, we are to remember, that in the *Definition* of *Imagination*, it is said to be a Conception by *little* and *little* *decaying*, or growing

growing more *obscure*. An *obscure* Conception is that which representeth the *whole Object* together, but *none* of the *smaller Parts* by themselves; and as *more* or *fewer* Parts be represented, so is the Conception or Representation said to be *more* or *less* clear. Seeing then the *Conception*, which when it was *first* produced by Sense, was *clear*, and represented the *Parts* of the Object *distinctly*; and when it cometh *again* is *obscure*, we find *missing* somewhat that we expected; by which we judge it *past* and *decayed*. For Example, a Man that is present in a *Foreign City*, seeth not only *whole* Streets, but can also distinguish particular *Houses*, and *Parts* of Houses; but departed thence, he cannot distinguish them so particularly in his Mind as he did, some *House* or *Turning* escaping him: yet is this to *remember*; when *afterwards* there escape him *more* Particulars, this is also to *remember*, but not so well. In Process of Time, the *Image* of the *City* returneth but as a *Mass* of Building *only*, which is *almost* to have forgotten it. Seeing then Remembrance is *more* or *less*, as we find more or less *Obscurity*, Why may not we well think *Remembrance* to be nothing else but the *missing* of *Parts*, which every man expecteth should succeed after they have a Conception of the *Whole*? To see at a great Distance of Place, and to remember at great Distance of Time, is to have like Conceptions of the Thing: for there wanteth Distinction of Parts in both; the one Conception being weak by Operation at Distance, the other by Decay.

8. And from this that hath been said, there followeth, That a Man can *never know* he dreameth; he may dream he doubteth, whether it be a Dream or no: but the Clearness of the Imagination representeth every Thing with as many Parts as doth Sense it self, and consequently, he can take Notice of nothing but as present; whereas to think he dreameth, is to think those his Conceptions, that is to say, obscurer than they were in the Sense: so that he must think them both as clear, and not as clear as Sense; which is impossible.

9. From the same Ground it proceedeth, that Men *wonder not* in their Dreams at Place and Persons, as they would do waking: for waking, a Man would think it strange to be in a Place where he never was before, and remember nothing of how he came there; but in a Dream, there cometh little of that kind into Consideration. The Clearness of Conception in a Dream, taketh away Distrust, unless the Strangeness be *excessive*, as to think himself fallen from on high without hurt, and then most commonly he *waketh*.

10. Nor is it possible for a Man to be so far deceived, as when his Dream is *past*, to think it real: for if he dream of such Things as are ordinarily in his Mind, and in such Order as he useth to do waking, and withal that he laid him down to sleep in the Place where he findeth himself when he awaketh; all which may happen: I know no *Kermion* or Mark by which he can discern whether it were a Dream or not, and therefore do the less wonder to hear a Man sometimes to tell his Dream for a Truth, or to take it for a Vision.

CHAP. IV.

1. *Discourse.*
2. *The Cause of Coherence of Thoughts.*
3. *Ranging.*
4. *Sagacity.*
5. *Reminiscence.*
6. *Experience.*
7. *Expectation.*
8. *Conjecture.*
9. *Signs.*
10. *Prudence.*
11. *Caveats of concluding from Experience.*

1. **T**HE Succession of Conceptions in the Mind; Series or Consequence of one after another, may be *casual* and incoherent, as in Dreams for the most part; and it may be *orderly*, as when the former Thought introduceth the latter; and this is *Discourse* of the Mind. But because the Word *Discourse* is commonly taken for the *Coherence* and Consequence of Words, I will, to avoid *Aequivocation*, call it *Discursion*.

2. The Cause of the *Coherence* or Consequence of one Conception to another, is their first *Coherence* or Consequence at that *Time* when they are produced by Sense: As for Example; from St. *Andrew* the Mind runneth to St. *Peter*; because their Names are read together;

C

S. Peter

S. Peter to a Stone, for the same Cause; from Stone to Foundation, because we see them together; and for the same Cause, from Foundation to Church, and from Church to People, and from People to *Example*; and according to this Example, the Mind may run almost from any Thing to any Thing. But as in the *Sense* the Conception of Cause and Effect may succeed one another; so may they after *Sense* in the *Imagination*: And for the most part they do so; the Cause whereof is the *Appetite* of them, who, having a Conception of the End, have next unto it a Conception of the next Means to that End; As, when a Man, from a Thought of *Honour* to which he hath an Appetite, cometh to the Thought of *Wisdom*, which is the next Means thereunto; and from thence to the Thought of *Study*, which is the next Means to *Wisdom*.

3. To omit that kind of Discursion by which we proceed from any Thing to any Thing, there are of the other Kind *divers* Sorts: As first, in the *Senses* there are certain Coherences of Conceptions, which we may call *ranging*: Examples whereof are; A Man casteth his Eye upon the Ground, to look about for some small Thing lost; the Hounds casting about at a Fault in hunting; and the Ranging of Spaniels: and herein we take a Beginning arbitrary.

4. Another sort of Discursion is, when the *Appetite* giveth a Man his Beginning, as in the Example before, where Honour to which a Man hath Appetite, maketh him think upon the next Means of attaining it, and that again of the next, &c. And this the Latines call *Sagacitas*,
and

and We may call *Hunting* or *Tracing*; as Dogs trace Beasts by the Smell, and Men hunt them by their Footsteps; or as Men hunt after Riches, Place, or Knowledge.

5. There is yet another Kind of Discursion beginning with the Appetite to recover something lost, proceeding from the *present backward*, from Thought of the Place where we *miss* at, to the Thought of the Place from whence we came *last*; and from the Thought of that, to the Thought of a Place *before*, till we have in our Mind some Place, wherein we had the Thing we miss; and this is called *Reminiscence*.

6. The *Remembrance* of Succession of one Thing to another, that is, of what was *antecedent*, and what *consequent*, and what *concomitant*, is called an *Experiment*; whether the same be made by us *voluntarily*, as when a Man putteth any Thing into the Fire, to see what Effect the Fire will produce upon it: or *not* made by us, as when we remember a fair Morning after a red Evening. To have had many *Experiments*, is that we call *Experience*, which is nothing else but *Remembrance* of what Antecedents have been followed by what Consequents.

7. No man can have in his Mind a Conception of the *future*; for the future is *not yet*: but of our Conceptions of the *past*, we make a *future*; or rather, call *past*, *future* relatively. Thus after a Man hath been accustomed to see like Antecedents follow by like Consequents, whensoever he seeth the like come to pass to any Thing he had seen before, he looks there should follow it the same that followed then:

As for Example, because a Man hath often seen Offences followed by Punishment; when he seeth an Offence in present, he thinketh Punishment to be consequent thereto; but consequent unto that which is present, Men call future. And thus we make *Remembrance* to be the *Provision* of Things to come, or *Expectation* or *Presumption* of the future.

8. In the same Manner, if a Man seeth in present that which he hath seen before, he thinks that that which was antecedent to that which he saw before, is also antecedent to that he presently seeth: As for Example, He that hath seen the Ashes remain after the Fire, and now again seeth ashes, concludeth again there hath been Fire: And this is called again *Conjecture* of the past, or *Presumption* of the Fact.

9. When a Man hath so often observed like Antecedents to be followed by like Consequents, that *whenever* he seeth the Antecedent, he looketh again for the Consequent; or when he seeth the Consequent, maketh account there hath been the like Antecedent; then he calleth both the Antecedent and the Consequent, *Signs* one of another, as Clouds are Signs of Rain to come, and Rain of Clouds past.

10. This taking of Signs by *Experience*, is that wherein Men do ordinarily think; the Difference stands between Man and Man in *Wisdom*, by which they commonly understand a Mans whole Ability or *Power cognitive*; but this is an *Error*: for the Signs are but *conjectural*; and according as they have often or seldom failed, so their *Assurance* is more or less; but *never full* and *evident*: for though a Man have always seen the

the Day and Night to follow one another hither-to; yet can he not thence conclude they shall do so, or that they have done so eternally: *Experience concludeth nothing universally.* If the Signs hit twenty times for one missing, a Man may lay a Wager of Twenty to One of the Event; but may not conclude it for a Truth. But by this it is plain, that they shall *conjecture best*, that have *most Experience*, because they have most Signs to conjecture by; which is the Reason *old Men* are *more prudent*, that is, conjecture better, *ceteris paribus*, than young: for, being old, they remember more; and Experience is but remembrance. And *men of quick imagination*, *ceteris paribus*, are *more prudent* than those whose Imaginations are slow: for they observe *more in less Time*. Prudence is nothing but Conjecture from Experience, or taking of Signs from Experience warily, that is, that the Experiments from which he taketh such Signs be all remembered; for else the Cases are not alike that seem so.

11. As in Conjecture concerning things past and future, it is Prudence to conclude from Experience, what is like to come to pass, or to have passed already; so it is an error to conclude from it, that *it is so* or *so called*; that is to say, We cannot from Experience conclude, that any Thing is to be called *just* or *unjust*, *true* or *false*, or any Proposition *universal* whatsoever, except it be from Remembrance of the Use of Names imposed arbitrarily by Men: For Example, to have heard a Sentence given in the like Case, the like Sentence a thousand times is

not enough to conclude that the Sentence is just; though most Men have no other Means to conclude by: But it is *necessary*, for the drawing of such Conclusion, to *trace and find out*, by many Experiences, what Men do mean by calling Things just and unjust. Further, there is another *Caveat* to be taken in concluding by Experience, from the tenth Section of the second Chapter; that is, That we conclude such Things to be without, that are within us.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

1. *Of Marks.*
2. *Names or Appellations.*
3. *Names positive and privative.*
4. *Advantage of Names maketh us capable of Science.*
5. *Names universal and singular.*
6. *Universals not in Rerum Natura.*
7. *Equivocal Names.*
8. *Understanding.*
9. *Affirmation, Negation, Proposition.*
10. *Truth, Falsity.*
11. *Ratiocination.*
12. *According to Reason, against Reason.*
13. *Names Causes of Knowledge, so of Error.*
14. *Translation of the Discourse of the Mind into the Discourse of the Tongue, and of the Errors thence proceeding.*

1. **S**EEING the Succession of Conceptions in the Mind are caused, as hath been said before, by the Succession they had one to another when they were produced by the Senses, and that there is no Conception that hath not bin produced immediately before or after innumerable others, by the innumerable Acts of Sense; it must needs follow, that one Conception followeth not another, according to our Election, and the need we have of them, but as it chanceth us to hear or see such Things as shall bring them to our Mind.

The Experience we have hereof, is in such Brute Beasts, which, having the providence to hide the Remains and Superfluity of their Meat, do nevertheless want the Remembrance of the Place where they hide it, and thereby make no Benefit thereof in their Hunger: but Man, who in this Point beginneth to rank himself somewhat above the Nature of Beasts, hath observed and remembered the Cause of this Defect, and to amend the same, hath imagined or devised to set up a visible or other sensible Mark, the which, when he seeth it again, may bring to his Mind the Thought he had when he set it up. A *Mark* therefore is a *sensible Object* which a Man erecteth voluntarily to himself, to the End to remember thereby somewhat past, when the same is objected to his Sense again: As men that have past by a Rock at Sea, set up some Mark, thereby to remember their former Danger, and avoid it.

2. In the Number of these *Marks*, are those *Humane Voices*, which we call the *Names* or *Appellations* of Things sensible by the Ear, by which we recall into our Mind some Conceptions of the Things to which we gave those Names or Appellations; as the Appellation *White* bringeth to remembrance the Quality of such Objects as produce that Colour or Conception in us. A *Name* or Appellation therefore is the *Voice* of a Man *arbitrary*, imposed for a *Mark* to bring into his Mind some Conception concerning the thing on which it is imposed.

3. Things named, are either the *Objects* themselves, as a Man; or the *Conception* it self that we have

have of Man, as Shape and Motion: or some Privation, which is when we conceive that there is something which we conceive not, in him; as when we conceive he is not just, not finite, we give him the Name of unjust, of infinite, which signifie Privation or Defect; and to the Privations themselves we give the Names of Injustice and Infiniteness: so that here be *Two Sorts* of Names; One of *Things*, in which we conceive something; or of the Conceptions themselves, which are called *positive*: the other of Things wherein we conceive *Privation* or Defect, and those Names are called *Privative*.

4. By the Advantage of *Names* it is that we are capable of *Science*, which Beasts, for want of them are not; nor Man, without the Use of them: for as a Beast misseeth not one or two out of many her young Ones, for want of those Names of order, One, Two, and Three, and which we call *Number*; so neither would a Man, without repeating orally or mentally the Words of Number, know how many Pieces of Money or other Things lie before him.

5. Seeing there be *many* Conceptions of *one* and the same Thing, and for *every* Conception we give it a *several* Name; it followeth that for one and the same Thing, we have many Names or Attributes; as to the same Man we give the Appellations of *Just*, *Valiant*, &c. for divers *Vertues*; of *Strong*, *Comely*, &c. for divers *Qualities* of the *Body*. And again, because from divers Things we receive like Conceptions, many Things must needs have the same Appellation: as to all Things we see, we give the same Name of *Visible*; and

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to all Things we see moveable, we give the Appellation of *Moveable*: and those Names we give to many, are called *universal* to them all; as the Name of Man to every particular of Mankind: such Appellation as we give to one only Thing, we call *individual*, or *singular*; as *Socrates*; and other proper Names: or, by Circumlocution, he that writ the *Iliads*, for *Homer*.

6. The Universality of one Name to many Things, hath been the Cause that Men think the Things are themselves universal; and so seriously contend, that besides *Peter* and *John*, and all the rest of the Men that are, have been, or shall be in the World, there is yet something else that we call *Man*, viz. *Man in general*, deceiving themselves, by taking the universal, or general Appellation, for the thing it signifieth: For if one should desire the Painter to make him the Picture of a Man, which is as much as to say, of a Man in general; he meaneth no more, but that the Painter should chuse what Man he pleaseth to draw, which must needs be some of them that are, or have been, or may be, none of which are *universal*. But when he would have him to draw the Picture of the King, or any particular Person, he limiteth the Painter to that one Person he chuseth. It is plain therefore, that there is nothing universal but Names; which are therefore called *indefinite*; because we limit them not our selves, but leave them to be applied by the Hearer: whereas a singular Name is limited and restrained to one of the many Things it signifieth; as when we say, This Man, pointing to him, or giving him his proper Name, or by some such other Way.

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7. The Appellations that be *universal*, and common to many Things, are *not* always given to all the *particulars*, (as they ought to be) for like Conceptions, and like Considerations in them all; which is the Cause that many of them are *not* of *constant* Signification, but bring into our Mind other Thoughts than these for which they were ordained, and those are called *equivocal*. As for Example, the Word Faith signifieth the same with Belief; sometimes it signifieth particularly that Belief which maketh a Christian; and sometime it signifieth the keeping of a Promise. Also all *Metaphors* are by Profession *equivocal*: and there is scarce any Word that is not made *equivocal* by divers Contextures of Speech, or by Diversity of Pronunciation and Gesture.

8. This *Equivocation* of Names maketh it *difficult* to recover those Conceptions for which the Name was ordained; and that not only in the Language of other Men, wherein we are to consider the *Drift* and *Occasion*, and *Texture* of the Speech, as well as the *Words* themselves; but also in our Discourse, which being derived from the Custom and common Use of Speech, representeth unto us not our own Conceptions. It is therefore a great Ability in a Man, out of the Words, Texture, and other Circumstances of Language, to deliver himself from *Equivocation*, and to find out the true Meaning of what it said: And this is it we call *Understanding*.

9. Of two *Appellations*, by the Help of this little Verb *is*, or something equivalent, we make an

an *Affirmation* or *Negation*, either of which in the Schools we call also a *Proposition*, and consisteth of two Appellations joyned together by the said Verb *is*: As for Example, Man is a living creature; or thus, Man is not righteous: where of the former is called an *Affirmation*, because the Appellation, Living Creature is *Positive*; the latter a *Negative*, because not righteous is *Privative*.

10. In every *Proposition*, be it *Affirmative* or *Negative*, the latter Appellation either comprehendeth the former, as in this Proposition, Charity is a Vertue, the Name of Vertue comprehendeth the Name of Charity, and many other Vertues beside; and then is the Proposition said to be *true*, or *Truth*: For, *Truth*, and a *true Proposition*, is all one. Or else the latter Appellation comprehendeth not the former: as in this Proposition, Every Man is just; the name of Just comprehendeth not Every Man; for Unjust is the Name of the far greater Part of Men: And the Proposition is said to be *false*, or *Falsity*: *Falsity* and a *false Proposition* being also the same Thing.

11. In what manner of two Propositions, whether both *Affirmative*, or one *Affirmative*, the other *Negative*, is made a *Syllogism*, I forbear to write. All this that hath been said of Names or Propositions, though *necessary*, is but *dry* Discourse: and this Place is not for the whole Art of Logick, which if I enter further into, I ought to pursue: Besides, it is not needfull; for there be few Men which have not so much natural Logick,

Logick, as thereby to discern well enough, whether any Conclusion I shall make in this Discourse hereafter, be well or ill collected: Only thus much I say in this Place, that *Making of Syllogisms* is that we call *Ratiocination* or *Reasoning*.

12. Now when a man *reasoneth* from Principles that are *found* indubitable by Experience, all Deceptions of Sense and Equivocation of Words avoided, the Conclusion he maketh is said to be *according to right Reason*: But when from his Conclusion a Man may, by good Ratiocination, derive that which is *contradictory* to any evident Truth whatsoever, then he is said to have concluded *against Reason*: And such a Conclusion is called *Absurdity*.

13. As the *Invention* of Names hath been necessary for the drawing Men out of Ignorance, by calling to their Remembrance the necessary Coherence of one Conception to another; so also hath it on the other side precipitated Men into *Error*: Infomuch, that whereas by the Benefit of Words and Ratiocination they exceed *brute Beasts* in Knowledge, and the Commodities that accompany the same; so they exceed them also in *Error*: For, *true* and *false* are Things not incident to Beasts, because they adhere not to Propositions and Language; nor have they Ratiocination, whereby to multiply one Untruth by another, as Men have.

14. It is the *Nature* almost of every *Corporal* Thing, being often moved in one and the same Manner, to receive continually a *greater* and *greater Easiness* and Aptitude to the same Motion, infomuch

so much as in Time the same becometh so *habituall*, that, to *beget* it, there needs no more than to *begin* it. The *Passions* of Man, as they are the Beginning of *voluntary* Motions; so are they the Beginning of *Speech*, which is the Motion of the Tongue. And Men desiring to shew others the Knowledge, Opinions, Conceptions and Passions which are in themselves, and to that End having invented *Language*, have by that Means transferred all that *Discursion* of their *Mind* mentioned in the former Chapter, by the *Motion* of their *Tongues*, into *Discourse* of *Words*: And *Ratio* now is but *Oratio*, for the most part, wherein Custom hath so great a Power, that the Mind suggesteth only the first Word; the rest follow *habitually*, and are not followed by the Mind; as it is with Beggars, when they saw their *Pater noster*, putting together such Words, and in such manner, as in their Education they have learned from their Nurses, from their Companies, or from their Teachers, having *no Images*, or *Conceptions* in their Mind, answering to the Words they speak: and as they have learned themselves, so they teach Posterity. Now if we consider the Power of those *Deceptions* of the Sense, mentioned Chap. 2. Sect. 10 and also how *unconstantly* Names have been settled, and how subject they are to *Aquivocation*, and how *diversified* by *Passion*, (scarce two Men agreeing what is to be called Good, and what Evil; what Liberality, what Prodigality; what Valour, what Temerity) and how subject Men are to Paralogism or Fallacy in Reasoning, I may in a Manner conclude, that

that it is impossible to rectifie so many Errors of any one Man, as must needs proceed from those Causes, without beginning *a-new* from the very first Grounds of all our Knowledge and Sense; and instead of Books, reading over orderly ones own Conceptions: In which Meaning, I take *Neste teipsum* for a Precept worthy the Reputation it hath gotten.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI

1. *Of the two Kinds of Knowledge*
2. *Truth and Evidence necessary to Knowledge.*
3. *Evidence defined.*
4. *Science defined.*
5. *Supposition defined.*
6. *Opinion defined.*
7. *Belief defined.*
8. *Conscience defined.*
9. *Belief, in some Cases, no less from Doubt than Knowledge.*

1. **T**HERE is a Story somewhere, of one that pretends to have been miraculously cured of Blindness (wherewith he was born) by St. *Albane* or other Saints, at the Town of St. *Albans*; and that the Duke of *Glocester* being there, to be satisfied of the Truth of the Miracle, asked the Man, What Colour is this? Who, by answering, It was Green, discovered himself, and was punished for a Counterfeit: for though by his Sight newly received he might distinguish between Green, and Red, and all other Colours, as well as any that should interrogate him, yet he could not possibly know at first Sight which of them was called Green, or Red, or by any other Name. By this we may understand, there be *two Kinds* of Knowledge, whereof the *one* is nothing else but

but *Sense*, or Knowledge *original*, as I have said in the Beginning of the second Chapter, and *Remembrance* of the same; the *other* is called *Science* or Knowledge of the *Truth of Propositions*, and how Things are called; and is derived from *Understanding*. Both of these Sorts are but *Experience*; The former being the Experience of the Effects of Things that work upon us from *without*; and the latter Experience Men have from the proper Use of *Names* in Language: and all Experience being, as I have said, but Remembrance, all Knowledge is Remembrance: and of the *former*, the Register we keep in Books, is called *History*; But the Registers of the *latter* are called the *Sciences*.

2. There are *two Things* necessarily implied in this Word *Knowledge*; the one is *Truth*, the other *Evidence*: for what is not Truth, can never be known. For, let a Man say he knoweth a Thing never so well, if the same shall afterwards appear false, he is driven to Confession, that it was not Knowledge, but Opinion. Likewise, if the Truth be not evident, though a Man holdeth it, yet is his Knowledge thereof no more than theirs who hold the contrary: for if Truth were enough to make it Knowledge, all Truth were known; which is not so.

3. What *Truth* is, hath been defined in the precedent Chapter; What *Evidence* is, I now set down: and it is the Concomitance of a Mans *Conception* with the *Words* that signifie such Conception in the Act of Ratiocination: for when a Man reasoneth with his Lips only, to which the

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Mind suggesteth only the Beginning, and followeth not the Words of his Mouth with the Conceptions of his Mind, out of Custom of so speaking; though he begin his Ratiocination with True Propositions, and proceed with certain Syllogisms, and thereby make always true Conclusions; yet are not his Conclusions *evident* to him, for Want of the *Concomitance* of Conception with his Words: for if the Words alone were sufficient, a Parrot might be taught as well to know Truth, as to speak it. Evidence is to Truth, as the Sap to the Tree, which, so far as it creepeth along with Body and Branches, keepeth them alive; where it forsaketh them, they die: for this Evidence, which is Meaning with our Words, is the Life of Truth.

4. Knowledge therefore which we call *Science*, I define to be *Evidence of Truth*, from some Beginning or Principle of *Sense*: for the Truth of a Proposition is never evident, until we conceive the Meaning of the Words or Terms whereof it consisteth, which are always Conceptions of the Mind: Nor can we remember those Conceptions, without the Thing that produced the same by our Senses. The *first* Principle of Knowledge is, that we have such and such *Conceptions*; the *second*, that we have thus and thus *named* the Things, whereof they are Conceptions; the *third* is, that we have *joyned* those *Names* in such Manner as to make true Propositions; the *fourth* and last is, that we have *joyned* those *Propositions* in such Manner as they be concluding, and the Truth of the Conclusion said to be known. And of these two Kinds of Knowledge, where-

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of the former is *Experience of Fact*, and the later of *Evidence of Truth*; as the former, if it be great, is called *Prudence*; so the latter, if it be much, hath usually been called, both by Ancient and Modern Writers, *Sapience* or *Wisdom*: and of this latter, *Man* only is capable; of the former, *brute Beasts* also participate.

5. A Proposition is said to be *supposed*, when, being *not evident*, it is nevertheless *admitted for a Time*, to the End, that, joyning to it other Propositions, we may *conclude* something; and to proceed from Conclusion to Conclusion, for a *Trial* whether the same will lead us into any *absurd* or impossible Conclusion; which if it do, then we know such Supposition to have been false.

6. But if, running thorow many Conclusions, we come to none that are *absurd*, then we think the Proposition *probable*: likewise we think probable whatsoever Proposition we *admit* for Truth by Error of Reasoning, or from trusting to other Men: And all such Propositions as are admitted by *Trust* or error, we are not said to *know*, but *think* them to be true; and the Admittance of them is called *Opinion*.

7. And particularly, when the Opinion is admitted out of *Trust* to other Men, they are said to *believe* it; and their Admittance of it is called *Belief*, and sometimes *Faith*.

8. It is either *Science* or *Opinion* which we commonly mean by the Word *Conscience*: for Men say that such and such a thing is true in or upon their Conscience; which they *never* do, when they think it *doubtful*; and therefore they *know*, or *think* they know it to be true. But Men, when

they say Things upon their Conscience, are not therefore presumed certainly to know the Truth of what they say : It remaineth then, that that Word is used by them that have an *Opinion*, not only of the *Truth* of the Thing, but also of their *Knowledge* of it, to which the *Truth* of the Proposition is consequent. *Conscience* I therefore define to be *Opinion of Evidence*.

9. *Belief*, which is the admitting of Propositions upon *Trust*, in many Cases is no less free from *Doubt*, than perfect and manifest *Knowledge* : for as there is nothing whereof there is not some Cause ; so, when there is *Doubt*, there must be some Cause thereof conceived. Now there be many Things which we receive from *Report of others*, of which it is impossible to imagine any Cause of *Doubt* : for what can be opposed against the Consent of all Men, in Things they can know, and have no Cause to report otherwise than they are, (such as is great Part of our *Histories*.) unless a Man would say that all the World had conspired to deceive him. And thus much of *Sense*, *Imagination*, *Discursion*, *Ratiocination*, and *Knowledge*, which are the Acts of our *Power cognitive*, or *conceptive*. That Power of the *Mind* which we call *motive*, differeth from the Power *motive* of the *Body* : for the Power *motive* of the *Body* is that by which it moveth other *Bodies*, and we call *Strength* ; but the Power *motive* of the *Mind*, is that by which the *Mind* giveth *animal Motion* to that *Body* wherein it existeth : the Acts hereof are our *Affections* and *Passions*, of which I am to speak in general.

C H A P. VII.

Of Delight, Pain, Love, Hatred.

Appetite, Aversion, Fear.

Good, Evil, Pulchritude, Turpitude.

End, Fruition.

Profitable, Use, Vain.

Felicity.

Good and Evil mixt

Sensual Delight, and Pain; Joy and Grief.

IN the eighth Section of the second Chapter is shewed, that *Conceptions* and *Apparitions* are nothing really, but *Motion* in some internal Substance of the *Head*; which Motion *not stopping* there, but proceeding to the *Heart*, of Necessity must there either *help* or *hinder* the Motion which is called *Vital*: when it *helpeth*, it is called *Delight*, *Contentment*, or *Pleasure*, which is nothing really but Motion about the *Heart*, as *Conception* is nothing but Motion in the *Head*; and the *Objects* that cause it are called *pleasant* or *delightful*, or by some Name equivalent; The *Latines* have *juvandum*, à *juvando*, from helping; and the same *Delight*, with Reference to the *Object*, is called *Love*: but when such Motion *weakeneth* or *hindereth* the *vital Motion*, then it is called *Pain*; and in Relation to that which causeth it, *Hatred*, which the *Latines* express

sometimes by *Odium*, and sometimes by *Tadium*.

2. This Motion in which consisteth *Pleasure* or *Pain*, is also a *Solicitation* or Provocation either to draw near to the Thing that pleaseth, or to retire from the Thing that displeaseth; and this Solicitation is the *Endeavour* or internal Beginning of animal Motion, which when the Object delighteth, is called *Appetite*; when it displeaseth, it is called *Aversion*, in Respect of the Displeasure present; but in Respect of the Displeasure expected, *Fear*. So that *Pleasure*, *Love*, and *Appetite*, which is also called *Desire*, are divers Names for divers Considerations of the same Thing.

3. Every Man, for his own Part, calleth that which pleaseth, and is delightful to himself, *Good*; and that *Evil* which displeaseth him: inasmuch that while every Man differeth from other in Constitution, they differ also from one another concerning the common Distinction of Good and Evil. Nor is there any such Thing as Absolute Goodness, considered without Relation: for even the Goodness which we apprehend in God Almighty, is his Goodness to us. And as we call Good and Evil the Things that please and displease; so call we Goodness and Badness, the Qualities or Powers whereby they do it: And the Signs of that Goodness are called by the Latines in one Word *Pulchritudo*, and the Signs of Evil, *Turpitudo*; to which we have no Words precisely answerable.

4. As all Conceptions we have immediately by the Sense, are, *Delight*, or *Pain*, or *Appetite*, or *Fear*; so are all the Imaginations after Sense. But as they are weaker Imaginations, so are they also weaker Pleasures, or weaker Pain.

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5. As *Appetite* is the Beginning of *animal* *Motions* towards something that pleaseth us; so is the *attaining* thereof, the *End* of that *Motion*, which we also call the *Scope*, and *Aim*; and final *Cause* of the same: and when we attain that *End*, the *Delight* we have thereby is called the *Fruition*: So that *Bonum* and *Finis* are different Names, but for different Considerations of the same Thing.

6. And of *Ends*, some of them are called *pro-
pinqui*, that is, near at hand; others *remoti*, far off: but when the *Ends* that be nearer attaining, be compared with those that be further off, they are called not *Ends*, but *Means*, and the *Way* to those. But for an *utmost* *End*, in which the ancient *Philosophers* have placed *Felicity*, and disputed much concerning the *Way* thereto, there is no such Thing in this *World*, nor *Way* to it, more than to *Utopia*: for while we live, we have *Desires*, and *Desire* presupposeth a further *End*. Those Things which please us, as the *Way* or *Means* to a further *End*, we call *profitable*; and the *Fruition* of them, *Use*; and those Things that profit not, *vain*.

7. Seeing all *Delight* is *Appetite*, and presupposeth a further *End*, there can be no *Contentment* but in *proceeding*: and therefore we are not to marvel, when we see, that as Men attain to more *Riches*, *Honour*, or other *Power*; so their *Appetite* continually groweth more and more; and when they are come to the utmost Degree of some Kind of *Power*, they pursue some other, as long as in any Kind they think themselves behind any other: of those therefore that have attained to

the highest Degree of Honour and Riches, some have affected Mastery in some Art; as *Nero* in Musick and Poetry, *Commodus* in the Art of a Gladiator; and such as affect not some such Thing, must find Diversion and Recreation of their Thoughts in the Contention either of Play or Business: and Men justly complain of a great Grief, that they know not what to do. *Felicity* therefore, by which we mean continual Delight, consisteth not in *having prospered*, but in *prospering*.

8. There are few Things in this World, but either have *Mixture* of Good and Evil, or there is a Chain of them so necessarily linked together, that the one cannot be taken without the other: As for Example, the Pleasures of Sin, and the Bitterness of Punishment, are inseparable; as is also Labour and Honour, for the most part. Now when in the *whole Chain*, the *greater Part* is good, the *Whole* is called *Good*; and when the *Evil* overweigheth, the *Whole* is called *Evil*.

9. There are two Sorts of Pleasure, whereof the *one* seemeth to affect the *corporeal* Organ of the Sense, and that I call *sensual*; the *greatest Part* whereof, is that by which we are invited to give Continuance to our *Species*; and the *next*, by which a Man is invited to Meat, for the Preservation of his *individual* Person: The *other Sort* of Delight is not particular to any Part of the Body, and is called The Delight of the *Mind*, and is that which we call *joy*. Likewise of *Pains*, some affect the *Body*, and are therefore called the *Pains* of the Body; and some *not*, and those are called *Grief*.

C H A P. VIII.

- 1, 2. *Wherein consist the Pleasures of Sense.*
- 3, 4. *Of the Imagination, or Conception of Power in Man.*
5. *Honour, honourable, Worth.*
6. *Signs of Honour.*
7. *Reverence.*

1. **H**AVING in the first Section of the precedent Chapter presupposed, that Motion and *Agitation of the Brain* which we call Conception, to be continued to the *Heart*, and there to be called *Passion*; I have therefore obliged my self, as far forth as I am able, to search out and declare from what Conception proceedeth every one of those *Passions* which we commonly take notice of: for, seeing the Things that please and displease, are innumerable, and work innumerable Ways, Men have not taken notice but of a very few, which also are many of them without Name.

2. And first, we are to consider, that of Conceptions there are *three Sorts*, whereof one is of that which is *present*, which is *Sense*; another, of that which is *past*, which is *Remembrance*; and the third, of that which is *future*, which we call *Expectation*: all which have been manifestly declared in the second and third Chapters; and every

every of these Conceptions is *Pleasure* or *Pain present*. And first for the Pleasures of the *Body* which affect the Sense of *Touch* and *Tast*, as far forth as they be *Organical*, their Conceptions are *Sense*: so also is the Pleasure of all *Exonerations* of Nature: All which Passions I have before named, *Sensual Pleasures*; and their contrary, *Sensual Pains*: to which also may be added the Pleasures and Displeasures of *Odours*, if any of them shall be found *Organical*, which for the most Part they are not, as appeareth by this Experience which every Man hath, that the same Smells, when they seem to proceed from others, displease, though they proceed from our selves; but when we think they proceed from our selves, they displease not, though they come from others: the Displeasure of this is a Conception of Hurt thereby from those Odours, as being unwholesom, and is therefore a Conception of Evil to come, and not present. Concerning the Delight of *Hearing*, it is diverse, and the Organ it self not affected thereby: *Simple Sounds* please by *Equality*, as the Sound of a Bell or Lute: insomuch as it seems, an Equality continued by the Percussion of the Object upon the Ear, is Pleasure; the Contrary is called *Harshness*, such as is Grating, and some other Sounds, which do not always affect the Body, but only sometime, and that with a Kind of Horrour beginning at the Teeth. *Harmony*, or many Sounds together agreeing, please by the same Reason as the *Unison*, which is the Sound of equal Strings equally stretched. Sounds that differ in any *Height*, please by *Inequality* and *Equality alternate*, that is to say, the higher
Note

Note striketh twice, for one Stroke of the other, whereby they strike together every second Time ; as is well proved by *Galileo*, in the first Dialogue concerning local Motion : where he also sheweth, that two Sounds differing a *fifth*, delight the Ear by an *Equality* of striking after two *Inequalities* ; for the higher Note striketh the Ear thrice, while the other strikes but twice. In like Manner he sheweth wherein consisteth the Pleasure of Concord, and the Displeasure of Discord, in other Difference of Notes. There is yet another Pleasure and Displeasure of Sounds, which consisteth in *Consequence* of one Note after another, diversified both by *Accent* and *Measure* ; whereof that which pleaseth is called *Air* ; but for what Reason Succession in Tone and Measure is more Air than another, I confess I know not ; but I conjecture the Reason to be, for that some of them imitate and revive some Passion which otherwise we take no Notice of, and the other not ; for no Air pleaseth but for a time, no more doth Imitation. Also the Pleasures of the Eye consist in a certain *Equality* of Colour : for *Light*, the most glorious of all Colours, is made by equal Operation of the Object ; whereas Colour is *perturbed*, that is to say, unequal Light, as hath been said, *Chap. 2. Sect. 8.* And therefore Colours, the more Equality is in them, the more resplendent they are : and as *Harmony* is pleasure to the Ear, which consisteth of divers Sounds ; so perhaps may some Mixture of divers Colours be *Harmony* to the Eye, more than another Mixture. There is yet another Delight by the Ear, which happeneth onely to Men of skill in Musick, which is of another Nature, (and not

not as these) Conception of the present, but rejoycing of their own Skill; of which nature are the Passions of which I am to speak next.

3. Conception of the *future*, is but a *Supposition* of the *same*, proceeding from *Remembrance* of what is past; and we so far *conceive* that any Thing *will be hereafter*, as we *know* there is *something at the present* that hath Power to produce it: and that any Thing hath Power now to produce another Thing hereafter, we cannot conceive, but by Remembrance that it hath produced the like heretofore. Wherefore all Conception of future, is Conception of Power able to produce something. Whosoever therefore expecteth Pleasure to come, must conceive withal some Power in himself by which the same may be attained. And because the Passions, whereof I am to speak next, consist in Conception of the future, that is to say, in Conception of Power past, and the Act to come; before I go any further, I must in the next Place speak somewhat concerning this Power.

4. By this Power I mean the same with the Faculties of the *Body*, *Nutritive*, *Generative*, *Motive*, and of the *Mind*, *Knowledge*; and besides these, such *further* Power as by them is acquired, *viz.* *Riches*, *Place of Authority*, *Friendship* or *Favour*, and *Good Fortune*; which last is really nothing else but the Favour of God Almighty. The *Contraries* of these are *Impotencies*, *Infirmities*, or *Defects* of the said Powers respectively. And because the Power of one Man resisteth and hindereth the Effects of the Power of another, *Power* simply is no more, but the *Excess* of the Power of one above that of another: for equal Powers opposed,

posed, destroy one another; and such their Opposition is called Contention.

5. The *Signs* by which we know our own *Power*, are those *Actions* which proceed from the same; and the *Signs* by which other *Men* know it, are such *Actions*, *Gesture*, *Countenance* and *Speech*, as usually such *Powers* produce: and the *Acknowledgement* of *Power* is called *Honour*; and to honour a *Man* inwardly, is to conceive or acknowledge that that *Man* hath the odds or Excess of that *Power* above him with whom he contendeth or compareth himself. And honourable are those *Signs* for which one *Man* acknowledgeth *Power* or Excess above his *Concurrent* in another: As for Example, *Beauty* of *Person*, consisting in a lively *Aspect* of the *Countenance*, and other *Signs* of *Natural Heat*, are honourable, being *Signs* precedent of *Power generative*, and much *Issue*; as also, general *Reputation* among those of the other *Sex*, because *Signs* consequent of the same. And *Actions* proceeding from *Strength of Body*, and open *Force*, are honourable, as *Signs* consequent of *Power motive*, such as are *Victory* in *Battel* or *Duel*; *A d'avoir tué son homme*. Also to adventure upon great *Exploits* and *Danger*, as being a *Sign* consequent of *Opinion* of our own *Strength*, and that *Opinion* a *Sign* of the *Strength* it self. And to teach or persuade are honourable, because they be *Signs* of *Knowledge*. And *Riches* are honourable; as *Signs* of the *Power* that acquired them: And *Gifts*, *Cost*, and *Magnificence* of *Houses*, *Apparel*, and the like, are honourable, as *Signs* of *Riches*. And *Nobility* is honourable
by

by Reflection, as a Sign of Power in the Ancestors: And *Authority*, because a Sign of the Strength, Wisdom, Favour or Riches by which it is attained. And *Good Fortune* or casual Prosperity is honourable, because a Sign of the Favour of God, to whom is to be ascribed all that cometh to us by Fortune, no less than that we attain unto by Industry. And the Contraries and Defects of these Signs are dishonourable, and according to the Signs of Honour and Dishonour, so we estimate and make the Value or Worth of a Man: for so much worth is every Thing, as a Man will give for the Use of all it can do.

6. The *Signs of Honour* are those by which we perceive that one Man acknowledgeth the Power and Worth of another; such as these; to praise, to magnifie, to bless, to call happy, to pray or supplicate to, to thank, to offer unto or present, to obey, to hearken unto with Attention, to speak to with Consideration, to approach unto in decent Manner, to keep Distance from, to give way to, and the like, which are the Honour the Inferiour giveth to the Superiour.

But the *Signs of Honour* from the Superiour to the Inferiour, are such as these; to praise or prefer him before his Concurrent, to hear more willingly, to speak to him more familiarly, to admit him nearer, to employ him rather, to ask his advice rather, to take his opinions, and to give him any Gifts rather than Money; or if Money, so much as may not imply his Need of a little: for Need of a little is greater Poverty than Need of much. And this is enough for Examples of the Signs of Honour and Power.

7. *Reverence* is the Conception we have concerning another, that he hath the *Power* to do unto us both *Good* and *Hurt*, but *not* the *Will* to do us *Hurt*.

8. In the Pleasure men have, or Displeasure from the Signs of Honour or Dishonour done unto them, consisteth the Nature of the Passions, whereof we are to speak in the next Chapter.

CHAP.

Of the Mind, is the Passion which proceedeth from the Imagination or Conception of our own Power above the Power of him that contendeth with us: the Sign whereof, besides those in the Countenance, and other Gestures of the Body which

CHAP. IX.

1. *Glory aspiring, false Glory, vain Glory.*
2. *Humility and Dejection.*
3. *Shame.*
4. *Courage.*
5. *Anger.*
6. *Revengefulness.*
7. *Hope, Despair, Diffidence.*
8. *Trust.*
9. *Pity and Hardness of Heart.*
10. *Indignation.*
11. *Emulation and Envie.*
12. *Laughter.*
13. *Weeping.*
14. *Lust.*
15. *Love.*
16. *Charity,*
17. *Admiration and Curiosity.*
18. *Of the Passion of them that flock to see Danger.*
19. *Of Magnanimity and Pusillanimity.*
20. *A View of the Passions represented in a Race.*

Glory, or internal Gloriation or Triumph of the Mind, is the Passion which proceedeth from the Imagination or Conception of our *own* Power above the Power of him that contendeth with us; the *Signs* whereof, besides those in the Countenance, and other Gestures of the Body which

which cannot be described, are, *Ostentation* in Words, and *Insolency* in Actions: and this Passion, of them whom it displeaeth, is called *Pride*; by them whom it pleaseth, it is termed a *just Valuation* of himself. This Imagination of our Power or Worth, may be from an assured and certain *Experience* of our own Actions; and then is that *Glory just*, and well grounded, and begetteth an Opinion of *increasing* the same by other Actions to follow; in which consisteth the Appetite which we call *Aspiring*, or Proceeding from one Degree of Power to another. The same Passion may proceed *not* from any *Conscience* of our own Actions, but from Fame and Trust of *others*, whereby one may think well of himself, and yet be deceived; and this is *false Glory*, and the *Aspiring* consequent thereto procureth ill Success. Further, the *Fiction* (which is also Imagination) of Actions done by our selves, which never were done, is *Glorjing*; but because it begetteth no Appetite nor endeavour to any further Attempt, it is merely *vain* and unprofitable; as when a Man imagineth himself to do the Actions whereof he readeth in some *Romance*, or to be like unto some other Man whose Acts he admireth: And this is called *Vain Glory*; and is exemplied in the Fable, by the Fly sitting on the Axletree, and saying to himself, What a Dust do I make rise! The expression of *Vain Glory* is that Wish, which some of the School mistaking for some Appetite distinct from all the rest, have called *Velleity*, making a new Word, as they made a new Passion which was not before. *Signs of Vain Glory* in

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the

the *Gesture*; are, *Imitation* of others, *Counterfeiting* and *Usurping* the Signs of *Virtue* they have not; *Affectation* of *Fashions*, *Captation* of *Honour* from their *Dreams*, and other little *Stories* of themselves, from their *Country*, from their *Names*, and from the like.

2. The *Passion* contrary to *Glory*, proceeding from *Apprehension* of our own *Infirmity*, is called *Humility* by those by whom it is approved; by the rest, *Dejection* and *Poorness*: which *Conception* may be well or ill grounded; if well, it produceth *Fear* to attempt any *Thing* rashly; if ill, it utterly cows a *Man*, that he neither dares speak publickly, nor expect good *Success* in any *Action*.

3. It happeneth sometimes, that he that hath a good *Opinion* of himself, and upon good ground, may nevertheless, by Reason of the *Forwardness* which that *Passion* begetteth, discover in himself some *Defect* or *Infirmity*, the *Remembrance* whereof dejecteth him; and this *Passion* is called *Shame*; by which being cooled and checked in his *Forwardness*, he is more wary for the *Time* to come. This *Passion*, as it is a *Sign* of *Infirmity*, which is *Dishonour*; so also it is a *Sign* of *Knowledge*, which is *Honour*. The *Sign* of it is *Blushing*, which appeareth less in *Men* conscious of their own *Defect*, because they less betray the *Infirmities* they acknowledge.

4. *Courage*, in a large *Signification*, is the *Absence* of *Fear* in the *Presence* of any evil whatsoever: but in a *Strict* and more common *Meaning*, it is *Contempt* of *Wounds* and *Death*, when they oppose a *Man* in the *Way* to his *End*.

5. *Anger* or sudden *Courage* is nothing but the

the *Appetite* or desire of *overcoming present Opposition*. It hath been defined commonly to be Grief proceeding from an Opinion of Contempt; which is confuted by the often Experience which we have of being moved to anger by things inanimate, and without Sense, and consequently incapable of contemning us.

6. *Revengefulness* is that Passion which ariseth from an Expectation or *Imagination* of making him that hath hurt us, find his own *Action* hurtful to himself, and to acknowledge the same; and this is the Height of Revenge: for though it be not hard, by returning Evil for Evil, to make ones Adversary displeased with his own Fact; yet to make him acknowledge the same, is so difficult, that many a Man had rather die than do it. Revenge aimeth not at the Death, but at the Captivity or Subjection of an Enemy; which was well expressed in the Exclamation of *Tiberius Caesar*, concerning one, that, to frustrate his Revenge, had killed himself in Prison; *Hath he escaped me?* To kill, is the aim of them that hate, to rid themselves out of Fear: *Revenge* aimeth at *Triumph*, which over the Dead is not.

7. *Repentance* is the Passion which proceedeth from *Opinion* or Knowledge that the *Action* they have done is *out of the Way* to the *End* they would attain: the Effect whereof is, to pursue that Way no longer, but, by the Consideration of the End, to direct themselves into a better. The first Motion therefore in this Passion is *Grief*; but the Expectation or Conception of returning again into the Way, is *joy*; and consequently, the Passion of *Repentance* is compounded

and allayed of both: but the *predominant* is Joy; else were the Whole Grief, which cannot be, forasmuch as he that proceedeth towards the End, he conceiveth Good, proceedeth with Appetite; and Appetite is Joy, as hath been said, Chap. 7. Sect. 2.

8. *Hope* is *Expectation* of Good to come, as Fear is the Expectation of Evil: But when there be Causes, some that make us expect Good, and some that make us expect Evil, alternately working in our Mind; if the Causes that make us expect Good, be greater than those that make us expect Evil, the whole Passion is Hope; if contrarily the Whole is Fear. Absolute Privation of hope is *Despair*, a degree whereof is *Diffidence*.

9. *Trust* is a Passion proceeding from the Belief of him from whom we expect or hope for Good, so free from Doubt that upon the same we pursue no other Way to attain the same Good: as *Distrust* or Diffidence is Doubt that maketh him endeavour to provide himself by other Means And that this is the Meaning of the Words Trust and Distrust, is manifest from this, that a Man never provideth himself by a second Way, but when he mistrusteth that the first will not hold

10. *Pity* is *Imagination* or *Fiction* of future Calamity to our selves, proceeding from the Sense of another Mans Calamity. But when it lighteth on such as we think have not deserved the same, the Compassion is greater, because then there appeareth more Probability that the same may happen to us: for, the Evil that
happeneth

happeneth to an innocent Man, may happen to every Man. But when we see a Man suffer for great Crimes, which we cannot easily think will fall upon our selves, the Pity is the less. And therefore Men are apt to pity those whom they love: for, whom they love, they think worthy of Good, and therefore not worthy of Calamity. Thence it is also, that Men pity the Vices of some Persons at the first Sight only, out of Love to their Aspect. The Contrary of Pity is *Hardness of Heart*, proceeding either from *Slowness* of Imagination, or some extreme great *Opinion* of their own *Exemption* from the like Calamity, or from hatred of all or most Men.

11. *Indignation* is that *Grief* which consisteth in the Conception of *good Success* happening to them whom they think *unworthy* thereof. Seeing therefore Men think all those unworthy whom they hate, they think them not only unworthy of the good Fortune they have, but also of their own Vertues. And of all the Passions of the Mind, these two, Indignation and Pity, are most raised and increased by Eloquence: for, the *Aggravation* of the Calamity, and *Extenuation* of the Fault, augmenteth Pity; and the *Extenuation* of the Worth of the Person, together with the magnifying of his Success, which are the Parts of an Orator, are able to turn these two Passions into *Fury*.

12. *Emulation* is *Grief* arising from seeing *ones self exceeded* or excelled by his *Concurrent*, together with *Hope* to equal or exceed him in Time to come, by his own Ability. But, *Envy* is the same *Grief* joyned with *Pleasure* conceiv-

ed in the Imagination of some *ill* Fortune that may befall him.

13. There is a Passion that hath *no Name*; but the Sign of it is that Distortion of the Countenance which we call *Laughter*, which is always *joy*: but what joy, what we think, and wherein we triumph when we laugh, is not hitherto declared by any. That it consisteth in *Wit*, or, as they call it, in the *jest*, Experience *confuteth*: for Men laugh at Mischances and Indecencies, wherein there lieth no Wit nor jest at all. And forasmuch as the same Thing is no more ridiculous when it groweth stale or usual, whatsoever it be that moveth Laughter, it must be *new* and *unexpected*. Men laugh often (especially such as are greedy of Applause from every Thing they do well) at their *own* Actions performed never so little beyond their own Expectations; as also at their own *jest*s: And in this Case it is manifest; that the Passion of Laughter proceedeth from a *sudden* conception of some *Ability* in himself that laugheth. Also Men laugh at the *Infirmities* of others, by Comparison where-with their own Abilities are set off and illustrated. Also Men laugh at *jest*s, the *Wit* whereof always consisteth in the elegant *Discovering* and Conveying to our minds some *Absurdity* of *another*: And in this case also the Passion of Laughter proceedeth from the *sudden* Imagination of our own Oddes and Eminency: for what is else the Recommending of our selves to our own good Opinion, by Comparison with another Mans Infirmity or absurdity? For when a Jest is broken upon our selves, or
Friends

Friends of whose Dishonour we participate, we never laugh thereat. I may therefore conclude, that the Passion of Laughter is nothing else but *sudden Glory* arising from some sudden Conception of some *Eminency* in our selves, by *Comparison* with the *Infirmity* of others, or with our own formerly: for Men laugh at the follies of themselves past, when they come suddenly to Remembrance, except they bring with them any present Dishonour. It is no wonder therefore that Men take hainously to be laughed at or derided, that is, triumphed over. Laughing *without Offence*, must be at *Absurdities* and *Infirmities abstracted* from Persons, and when all the Company may laugh together: for, laughing to ones self putteth all the rest into Jealousie, and Examination of themselves. Besides, it is Vain-Glory, and an Argument of little Worth, to think the *Infirmity* of another, sufficient Matter for his Triumph.

14. The Passion opposite hereunto, (whose Signs are another Distortion of the Face with Tears) called *Weeping*, is the *sudden Felling out* with our selves, or sudden Conception of Defect; and therefore *Children* weep often: for seeing they think that every Thing ought to be given them which they desire, of Necessity every Repulse must be a Check of their Expectation, and puts them in mind of their too much Weakness to make themselves Masters of all they look for. For the same Cause *Women* are more apt to weep than men, as being not only more accustomed to have their Wills, but also to measure their Powers by the Power and

Love of others that protect them. Men are apt to weep that prosecute Revenge, when the Revenge is suddenly stopt or frustrated by the Repentance of their Adversary; and such are the Tears of *Reconciliation*. Also revengeful Men are subject to this Passion upon the beholding those Men they pity, and suddenly remember they cannot help. Other weeping in Men proceedeth for the most part from the same Cause it proceedeth from in Women and Children.

15. The Appetite which Men call *Lust*, and the Fruition that appertaineth thereunto, is a *Sensual* Pleasure, but *not only* that; there is in it also a Delight of the Mind: for it consisteth of two Appetites together, to *please*, and to *be pleased*; and the Delight Men take in delighting, is not sensual, but a Pleasure or joy of the Mind consistin^g in the Imagination of the Power they have so much to please. But the Name *Lust* is used where it is condemned; otherwise it is called by the general Word *Love*: for the Passion is one and the same indefinite Desire of different Sex, as natural as Hunger.

16. Of *Love*, by which is understood the Joy Man taketh in the Fruition of any *present* Good, hath been already spoken of in the first Section, Chap. 7. under which is contained the *Love* Men bear to one *another*, or Pleasure they take in one anothers Company; and by which Nature, Men are said to be sociable. But there is another Kind of Love, which the Greeks call *ἔρως*, and is that which we mean, when we say that a Man is in Love: Forasmuch as this Pas-
sion

sion cannot be without Diversity of Sex, it cannot be denied but that it *participateth* of that indefinite *Love* mentioned in the former Section. But there is a great Difference betwixt the Desire of a Man *indefinite*, and the same Desire *limited ad hunc*; and this is that *Love* which is the great Theme of Poets: But notwithstanding their Praises, it must be defined by the Word *Need*: for it is a Conception a Man hath of his Need of *that one Person* desired. The Cause of this Passion is *not* always *nor* for the most part *Beauty*, or other Quality in the Beloved, unless there be withall *Hope* in the Person that loveth: which may be gathered from this, that in great Difference of Persons, the *greater* have often sals in love with the *meaner*; but not contrary. And from hence it is, that for the most part they have much better Fortune in Love, whose Hopes are built upon something *in their Person*, than those that trust to their *Expressions* and *Service*; and they that *care less*, than they that *care more*: which not perceiving, many Men cast away their Services, as one Arrow after another, till, in the End, together with their Hopes, they lose their Wits.

17. There is yet another Passion sometimes called *Love*, but more properly *good Will* or *Charity*. There can be no greater Argument to a Man, of his own Power, than to find himself able not only to accomplish his own Desires, but also to *assist* other Men in theirs: and this is that Conception wherein consisteth *Charity*. In which, first, is contained that *natural Affection* of Parents to their Children; which the *Greeks* call

call *Στοργή*, as also, that Affection wherewith Men seek to assist those that adhere unto them. But the Affection wherewith Men many times bestow their Benefits on *Strangers*, is not to be called Charity, but either *Contract*, whereby they seek to purchase friendship; or *Fear*, which maketh them to purchase peace. The Opinion of *Plato* concerning honourable Love, delivered according to his Custom in the Person of *Socrates*, in the Dialogue intituled *Convivium*, is this, That a Man full and pregnant with Wisdom and other Vertues, naturally seeketh out some beautiful Person, of Age and Capacity to conceive, in whom he may, without sensual Respects, ingender and produce the like. And this is the *Idea* of the then noted Love of *Socrates* wise and continent, to *Alcibiades* young and beautiful: In which, Love is not the sought Honour, but the Issue of his Knowledge; contrary to the common Love, to which though Issue sometimes follows, yet Men seek not that, but to please, and to be pleased. It should be therefore this Charity, or Desire to assist and advance others. But why then should the Wise seek the Ignorant, or be more charitable to the Beautiful than to others? There is something in it favouring of the Use of that time: in which Matter though *Socrates* be acknowledged for continent, yet the *Continent* have the Passion they contain, as much and more than they that satiate the Appetite; which maketh me suspect this *Platonick* Love for meerly sensual; but with an honourable Pretence for the Old to haunt the Company of the young and beautiful.

18. Forasmuch as all Knowledge beginneth from *Experience*, therefore also *new Experience* is the Beginning of *new Knowledge*, and the Increase of Experience the Beginning of the Increase of Knowledge. Whatsoever therefore happeneth new to a Man, giveth him Matter of *Hope* of *knowing* somewhat that he knew *not before*. And this Hope and Expectation of future Knowledge from any Thing that happeneth new and strange, is that Passion which we commonly call *Admiration*; and the same considered as Appetite, is called *Curiosity*, which is Appetite of Knowledge. As in the discerning of Faculties, *Man leaveth* all Community with *Beasts* at the Faculty of *imposing Names*; so also doth he surmount their Nature at this *Passion* of *Curiosity*. For when a Beast seeth any Thing new and strange to him, he considereth it so far only as to discern whether it be likely to serve his turn, or hurt him, and accordingly approacheth nearer to it, or fleeth from it: Whereas Man, who in most Events remembereth in what manner they were caused and begun, looketh for the Cause and Beginning of every Thing that ariseth new unto him. And from this Passion of Admiration and Curiosity; have arisen not only the Invention of Names, but also Supposition of such Causes of all Things as they thought might produce them. And from this Beginning is derived all *Philosophy*; as *Astronomy* from the Admiration of the Course of Heaven; *Natural Philosophy* from the strange Effects of the Elements and other Bodies. And from the Degrees of Curiosity, proceed also the Degrees

Degrees of Knowledge amongst Men : For , to a Man in the Chace of Riches or Authority,) which in Respect of Knowledge are but Sensuality.) it is a Diversity of little Pleasure , whether it be the Motion of the Sun or the Earth that maketh the Day , or to enter into other Contemplations of any strange Accident , than whether it conduce or not to the End he pursueth. Because *Curiosity* is *Delight* , therefore also *Novelty* is so , but especially that *Novelty* from which a Man conceiveth an *Opinion* true or false of *bettering* his own Estate ; for , in such Case , they stand affected with the Hope that all Gamesters have while the Cards are shuffling.

19. Divers other Passions there be , but they want Names : whereof some nevertheless have been by most Men observed : For Example ; from what Passion proceedeth it , that Men take *pleasure* to *behold* from the Shore the *Danger* of them that are at Sea in a Tempest , or in Fight , or from a safe Castle to behold two Armies charge one to another in the Field ? It is certainly , in the whole Summ , *Joy* ; else Men would never flock to such a Spectacle. Nevertheless there is in it both *Joy* and *Grief* : for as there is *Novelty* and Remembrance of our own Security present , which is *Delight* : so there is also *Pity* , which is *Grief* : But the *Delight* is so far predominant , that Men usually are content in such a Case to be Spectators of the Misery of their Friends.

20. *Magnanimity* is no more than *Glory* , of the which I have spoken in the first Section ; but *Glory* well grounded upon certain Experience of

a Power sufficient to attain his End in open Manner. And *Pusillanimity* is the *Doubt* of that. Whatsoever therefore is a Sign of *Vain Glory*, the same is also a Sign of *Pusillanimity*: for sufficient Power maketh Glory a Spur to ones End. To be *pleased* or *displeased* with *Fame true* or *false*, is a *Sign* of that same, because he that relieth on Fame hath not his Success in his own Power. Likewise *Art* and *Fallacy* are Signs of *Pusillanimity*, because they depend not upon our own Power, but the Ignorance of others. Also *Proneness to Anger*, because it argueth Difficulty of proceeding. Also *Ostentation of Ancestors*, because all Men are more inclined to make shew of their own Power when they have it, than of anothers. To be at *Enmity* and Contention with *Inferiours*, is a Sign of the same, because it proceedeth from Want of Power to end the War. To *laugh* at others, because it is an Affectation of Glory from other Mens Infirmities, and not from any Ability of their own. Also *Irresolution*, which proceedeth from Want of power enough to condemn the little Difficulties that make Deliberations hard.

21. The Comparison of the Life of Man to a Race, though it hold not in every Part, yet it holdeth so well for this our Purpose, that we may thereby both see and remember almost all the Passions before mentioned. But this *Race* we must suppose to have no other *Goal*, nor other *Garland*, but being formost, and in it To endeavour, is *Appetite*.
To be remiss, is *Sensuality*.

To

To consider them behind, is *Glory*.
 To consider them before, is *Humility*.
 To lose Ground with looking back, *Vain-Glory*.
 To be holden, *Hatred*.
 To turn back, *Repentance*.
 To be in breath, *Hope*.
 To be weary, *Despair*.
 To endeavour to overtake the next, *Emulation*.
 To supplant or overthrow, *Envie*.
 To resolve to break thorow a Stop foreseen, *Courage*.
 To break thorow a sudden Stop, *Anger*.
 To break thorow with Ease, *Magnanimity*.
 To lose Ground by little Hindrances, *Puſillanimity*.
 To fall on the sudden, is Disposition to *weep*.
 To see another fall, is Disposition to *laugh*.
 To see one out-gone whom we would not, is *Pity*.
 To see one out-goe whom we would not, is *Indignation*.
 To hold fast by another, is to *love*.
 To carry him on that so holdeth, is *Charity*.
 To hurt ones self for haſt, is *Shame*.
 Continually to be out-gone is *Miſery*.
 Continually to out-go the next before, is *Felicity*.
 And to forſake the Courſe, is to *die*.

CHAP. X.

1. **H**AVING shewed in the precedent Chapters, that Sense proceedeth from the Action of external Objects upon the *Brain*, or some internal *Substance* of the *Head*; and that the *Passions* proceed from the Alteration there made, and continued to the *Heart*: It is consequent in the next Place, seeing the Diversity of Degrees in Knowledge in divers Men, to be greater than may be ascribed to the divers *Tempers* of their *Brain*, to declare *what other Causes* may produce such *Oddes*, and Excess of *Capacity*, as we daily observe in one Man above another. As for that Difference which ariseth from *Sickness*, and such accidental Distempers, I omit the same, as impertinent to this Place, and consider, it only in such as have their *Health*, and *Organs* well disposed. If the Difference were in the natural Temper of the *Brain*, I can imagin no Reason why the same should not appear first and most of all in the Senses, which being equal both in the wise and less wise, infer an equal Temper in the common Organ (namely the *Brain*) of all the Senses.

2. But we see by Experience, that *Joy* and *Grief* proceed not in all Men from the same Causes, and that men differ very much in the Constitution.

on of the Body ; whereby , that which helpeth and furthereth *vital Constitution* in one, and is therefore delightful, hindereth it and crosseth it in another, and therefore causeth Grief. The *Difference* therefore of *Wits* hath its Original from the *different Passions*, and from the *Ends* to which the Appetite leadeth them.

3. And first, those Men whose Ends are *sensual Delight*, and generally are addicted to *Ease*, *Food*, *Operations* and *Exonerations* of the Body , must needs be the *less* thereby delighted with those *Imaginations* that *conduce* not to those Ends, such as are *Imaginations* of *Honour* and *Glory* , which , as I have said before, have Respect to the future : For *Sensuality* consisteth in the Pleasure of the Senses, which please only for the present, and take away the Inclination to observe such Things as conduce to Honour, and consequently maketh Men less curious, and less ambitious , whereby they less consider the Way either to Knowledge or other Power : in which two consisteth all the Excellency of Power cognitive. And this is it which Men call *Dulness*, and proceedeth from the Appetite of sensual or bodily Delight. And it may well be conjectured, that such Passion hath its Beginning from a *Grossness* and *Difficulty* of the *Motion* of the *Spirit* about the *Heart*.

4. The Contrary hereunto, is that *quick Ranging* of Mind described , Chap. 4. Sect. 3. which is joyned with *Curiosity* of comparing the Things that come into the Mind, one with another : in which Comparison , a Man delighteth himself either with finding unexpected *Similitude* of Things , otherwise much unlike ; in which
Men

Men place the Excellency of *Fancy*, and from whence proceed those grateful Similies, Metaphors, and other Tropes, by which both *Poets* and *Orators* have it in their Power to make Things please or displease, and shew well or ill to others, as they like themselves; or else in discerning suddenly *Dissimilitude* in Things that otherwise appear the same. And this Vertue of the Mind is that by which Men attain to exact and perfect *Knowledge*; and the Pleasure thereof consisteth in continual Instruction, and in Distinction of Places, Persons, and Seasons, and is commonly termed by the Name of *Judgement*: for, to judge is nothing else, but to distinguish or discern: And both *Fancy* and *Judgement* are commonly comprehended under the Name of *Wit*, which seemeth to be a Tenuity and Agility of Spirits, contrary to that Restiness of the Spirits supposed in those that are dull.

5. There is another Defect of the Mind, which Men call *Levity*, which betrayeth also *Mobility* in the Spirits; but in Excess. An Example whereof is in them that in the midst of any serious Discourse, have their Minds diverted to every little Jest or witty Observation; which maketh them depart from their Discourse by a Parenthesis, and from that Parenthesis by another, till at length they either lose themselves, or make their Narration like a Dream, or some studied Nonsense. The Passion from whence this proceedeth, is *Curiosity*, but with *too much Equality* and Indifference: for when all Things make equal Impression and Delight, they equally throng to be expressed.

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6. The

6. The Vertue opposite to this Defect, is *Gravity*, or *Steadiness*; in which the End being the great and Master-Delight, directeth and keepeth in the Way thereto all other Thoughts.

7. The *Extremity* of *Dulness* is that *natural Folly* which may be called *Stolidity*: But the Extremum of *Levity*, though it be natural Folly distinct from the other, and obvious to every Mans Observation, I know *not* how to call it.

8. There is a Fault of the Mind called by the Greeks *Ἀνασίζ*, which is *Indocibility*, or *Difficulty* of being taught; the which must needs arise from a *false Opinion* that they *know already* the Truth of that is called in question: for certainly Men are not otherwise so unequal in capacity as the *Evidence* is unequal between what is taught by the Mathematicians, and what is commonly discoursed of in other Books: and therefore if the Minds of Men were all of white Paper, they would all most equally be disposed to acknowledge whatsoever should be in right Method, and by right Ratiocination delivered to them: But when Men have once acquiesced in untrue Opinions, and registred them as Authentical Records in their Minds, it is no less impossible to speak intelligibly to such Men, than to write legibly upon a Paper already scribbled over. The immediate Cause therefore of *Indocibility*, is *Prejudice*; and of prejudice, false Opinion of our own Knowledge.

9. Another, and a principal Defect of the Mind, is that which Men call *Madness*, which appeareth to be nothing else but some *Imagination* of some such *Predominancy* above the rest, that we have *no Passion but from it*; and this Con-

Concepcion is nothing else but excessive *vain Glory*, or *vain Dejection*: which is most propable by these Examples following, which proceed in Appearance every one of them from *Pride*, or some *Dejection* of Mind. As first, we have had the Example of one that preached in *Cheapside* from a Cart there, instead of a Pulpit, that he himself was Christ, which was *spiritual Pride* or Madness. We have had also divers Examples of Learned Madness, in which Men have manifestly been distracted upon any Occasion that hath put them in Remembrance of their own Ability. Amongst the learned Men, may be remembered (I think also) those that determine of the Time of the Worlds End, and other such the Points of Prophecy. And the gallant Madness of *Don Quixotte* is nothing else but an Expression of such Height of vain Glory as reading of *Romance* may produce in pusillanimous Men. Also Rage and Madness of Love, are but great Indignations of them in whose Brains is predominant Contempt from their Enemies, or their Mistresses. And the *Pride* taken in *Form* and *Behaviour*, hath made divers Men run mad, and to be so accounted, under the Name of Fantastick.

10. And as these are the Examples of Extremities, so also are there Examples too many of the Degrees, which may therefore be well accounted Follies; as it is a Degree of the *first*, for a Man, without certain Evidence, to think himself to be *inspired*, or to have any other Effect of Gods holy Spirit than other godly Men have. Of the *second*, for a Man continually to speak his mind in a *Cento* of other Mens Greek or Latine Sen-

tences. Of the *third*, much of the present Gallantry in Love and Duel. Of *Rage*, a Degree is *Malice*; and of *Fantastick* Madness, *Affection*.

11. As the former Examples exhibit to us Madness, and the Degrees thereof, proceeding from the Excess of Self-Opinion; so also there be other Examples of Madness, and the Degrees thereof, proceeding from *too much vain Fear* and *Dejection*; as in those melancholy Men that have imagined themselves brittle as Glass, or have had some other like Imagination: and Degrees hereof are all those exorbitant and causeless Fears, which we commonly observe in melancholy Persons.

CHAP. XI.

1. **H**itherto of the Knowledge of Things *natural* and of the Passions that arise naturally from them. Now forasmuch as we give Names not only to Things natural, but also to *supernatural*; and by all Names we ought to have some Meaning and Conception: It followeth in the next Place, to consider what Thoughts and Imaginations of the Mind we have, when we take into our Mouths the most blessed Name of GOD, and the Names of those *Vertues* we attribute unto him; as also, what *Image* cometh into the Mind at hearing the Name of *Spirit*, or the Name of *Angel*, good or bad.

2. And forasmuch as God Almighty is *incomprehensible*, it followeth, that we can have *no* Conception or *Image* of the *Deity*, and consequently, all *his Attributes* signifie our *Inability* and Defect of Power to *conceive* any Thing concerning his Nature, and not any Conception of the same, excepting only this, That *there is a God*: For the Effects we acknowledge naturally, do include a Power of their producing, before they were produced; and that Power presupposeth something existent that hath such Power: And the Thing so existing with Power to produce, if it were not *Eternal*, must needs have been produced by something before it, and that again by something else before that, till we come to an *Eternal* (that is to

say, the first) Power of all Powers, and first Cause of all Causes: And this is it which all Men conceive by the Name of GOD, implying Eternity, Incomprehensibility, and Omnipotency. And thus all that will consider, may know *that* God is, though not *what* he is: even a Man that is born blind, though it be not possible for him to have any Imagination what Kind of thing Fire is; yet he cannot but know that somewhat there is that Men call Fire, because it warmeth him.

2. And whereas we attribute to God Almighty, *Seeing, Hearing, Speaking, Knowing, Loving*, and the like, by which Names we understand something in Men to whom we attribute them, we understand *nothing* by them in the Nature of God: For, as it is well reasoned, *Shall not the God that made the Eye, see; and the Ear, hear?* So it is also, if we say, Shall God, which made the Eye, not see without the Eye; or that made the Ear, not hear without the Ear; or that made the Brain, not know without the Brain; or that made the Heart, not love without the Heart? The *Attributes* therefore given unto the Deity, are such as *signifie* either our *Incapacity* or our *Reverence*: Our Incapacity, when we say Incomprehensible and Infinite; our Reverence, when we give him those Names, which amongst us are the Names of those Things we most magnifie and commend, as Omnipotent, Omniscient, Just, Merciful, &c. And when God Almighty giveth those Names to himself in the Scriptures, it is but *ἀνθρωπινῶς*, that is to say, by descending to our Manner of speaking; without which we are not capable of understanding him.

4. By the Name of *Spirit*, we understand a *Body natural*, but of such *Subtily*, that it worketh not upon the Senses; but that filleth up the Place which the Image of a visible Body might fill up. Our Conception therefore of Spirit consisteth of *Figure without Colour*; and in Figure is understood Dimension, and consequently, to conceive a Spirit, is to conceive something that hath Dimension. But *Spirits supernatural* commonly signifie some *Substance without Dimension*; which two Words do flatly contradict one another: and therefore when we attribute the Name of Spirit unto God, we attribute it not as the Name of any Thing we conceive, no more than we ascribe unto him Sense and Understanding; but, as a Signification of our Reverence, we desire to abstract from him all corporal Grossness.

5. Concerning other Things, which some Men call *Spirits incorporeal*, and some *corporeal*, it is not possible by *natural Means* only, to come to *Knowledge* of so much, as that *there are such Things*. We that are Christians *acknowledge* that there be Angels good and evil, and that there are Spirits, and that the Soul of Man is a Spirit, and that those Spirits are immortal: *but*, to *know* it, that is to say, to have natural Evidence of the same, it is *impossible*: For, all *Evidence* is *Conception*, as it is said, Chap. 6. Sect. 3. and all *Conception* is *Imagination*, and proceedeth from *Sense*, Chap. 3. Sect. 1. And *Spirits* we suppose to be those Substances which work *not* upon the *Sense*; and therefore not conceivable. But though the Scripture acknowledge Spirits,

yet doth it no where say, that they are incorporeal, meaning thereby, without Dimension and Quality: Nor, I think, is that Word Incorporeal at all in the Bible; but it is said of the Spirit, that it abideth in Men; sometimes that it dwelleth in them, sometimes that it cometh on them, that it descendeth, and goeth, and cometh; and that Spirits are Angels, that is to say, Messengers: all which Words do imply *Locality*; and *Locality* is *Dimension*; and whatsoever hath Dimension, is *Body*, be it never so subtil. To me therefore it seemeth, that the Scripture favoureth them more, who hold Angels and Spirits corporeal, than them that hold the contrary. And it is a plain *Contradiction* in natural Discourse, to say of the Soul of Man, that it is *tota in toto, & tota in qualibet Parte Corporis*, grounded neither upon Reason nor Revelation, but proceeding from the Ignorance of what those Things are which are called *Spectra*, Images, that appear in the dark to Children, and such as have strong Fears, and other strange Imaginations, as hath been said, Chap. 3. Sect. 5. where I call them Phantasms; For, taking them to be Things real, without us, like Bodies, and seeing them to come and vanish so strangely as they do, unlike to Bodies; what could they call them else, but *incorporeal Bodies*? which is not a Name, but an Absurdity of Speech.

6. It is true, that the Heathens, and all Nations of the World, have acknowledged that there be *Spirits*, which for the most part they hold to be incorporeal; whereby it might be thought, that a Man by natural Reason, may arrive,

rive, without the Scriptures, to the Knowledge of this, *That Spirits are*: But the erroneous Collection thereof by the Heathens, may proceed, as I have said before, from the Ignorance of the Cause of Ghosts and Phantasms, and such other Apparitions. And from thence had the Grecians their Number of Gods, their Number of *Demons* good or bad, and for every Man his *Genius*; which is not the Acknowledging of this Truth, *That Spirits are*; but a false Opinion concerning the Force of Imagination.

7. And seeing the Knowledge we have of *Spirits*, is *not natural* Knowledge, but *Faith* from supernatural Revelation given to the holy Writers of the Scriptures; it followeth, that of Inspirations also, which is the Operation of Spirit in us, the Knowledge which we have, must all proceed from Scripture. The *Signs* there set down of *Inspiration*, are *Miracles*, when they be great, and manifestly above the Power of Men to do by Imposture: As for Example, the Inspiration of *Elias* was known by the miraculous Burning of the Sacrifice. But the *Signs* to distinguish whether a *Spirit* be good or evil, are the same by which we distinguish whether a Man or a Tree be good or evil, namely, *Actions* and *Fruit*: For there are *lying* Spirits, where-with Men are inspired sometimes, as well as with *Spirits* of *Truth*. And we are commanded in Scripture, to judge of the Spirits by their Doctrine, and not of the Doctrine by the Spirits. For Miracles, our Saviour hath forbidden us to rule our Faith by them, *Matth. 24. 24.* And Saint Paul saith, *Gal. 1. 8. Though an Angel from Heaven preach*

*preach to you otherwise, &c. let him be accur-
sed.* Where it is plain, that we are not to judge
whether the Doctrine be true or not, by the
Angel; but whether the Angel say true or no,
by the Doctrine. So likewise, 1 Joh. 4. 1. *Believe
not every Spirit: for false Prophets are gone out in-
to the World.* Vers. 2. *Hereby shall ye know the
Spirit of God.* Vers. 3. *Every Spirit that confesseth
not that Jesus Christ is come in the Flesh, is
not of God: and this is the Spirit of Antichrist.*
Vers. 15. *Whoever confesseth that Jesus is the
Son of God, in him dwelleth God, and he in God.*
The Knowledge therefore we have of good and
evil Inspiration, cometh not by Vision of an An-
gel that may teach it, nor by a Miracle that
may seem to confirm it; but by Conformity of
Doctrine with this Article and Fundamental Point
of Christian Faith, which also Saint Paul saith
is the sole Foundation, *That Jesus Christ is come
in the Flesh,* 1 Cor. 3. 11

8. But if Inspiration be discerned by this
Point, and this Point be acknowledged and be-
lieved upon the Authority of the Scriptures; How
(may some Men ask) know we that the Scri-
pture deserveth so great Authority, which must be
no less than that of the lively Voice of God;
that is, how we know the Scriptures to be the
Word of God? And first, it is manifest, that if by
Knowledge we understand Science infallible and
natural, as is defined, Chap. 6. Sect. 4. proceeding
from Sense, we cannot be said to know it, be-
cause it proceedeth not from the Conceptions
ingendered by Sense. And if we understand
Knowledge as supernatural, we cannot have it
but

but by Inspiration: And of that *Inspiration* we cannot judge, but by the *Doctrine*: It followeth, that we have not any Way, natural or supernatural, of the *Knowledge* thereof, which can properly be called *Infallible Science* and *Evidence*. It remaineth, that the Knowledge that we have that the Scriptures are the Word of God, is only *Faith*, which Faith therefore is also by Saint Paul defined, *Heb. 11. 1.* to be the *Evidence of Things not seen*; that is to say, not otherwise evident but by Faith: for, whatsoever either is evident by Natural Reason, or Revelation supernatural, is not called Faith; else should not Faith cease, no more than Charity, when we are in Heaven; which is contrary to the Doctrine of the Scripture. And, we are *not* said to *believe*, but to *know* those Things that be *evident*.

9. Seeing then the Acknowledgment of Scriptures to be the Word of God, is not Evidence, but Faith, and Faith (Chap. 6. Sect. 7.) consisteth in the Trust we have of other Men, it appeareth plain, that the Men so trusted, are the holy Men of Gods Church succeeding one another from the Time of those that saw the wondrous Works of God Almighty in the Flesh. Nor doth this imply that God is not the Worker or Efficient Cause of Faith, or that Faith is begotten in Man without the Spirit of God: for, all those good Opinions which we admit and believe, though they proceed from Hearing, and Hearing from Teaching, both which are natural, yet they are the Work of God: for, all the Works of Nature are his, and they are attributed to the Spirit of God: As for

for Example, *Exod. 28. 3. Thou shalt speak unto all cunning Men, whom I have filled with the SPIRIT of wisdom, that they may make Aaron's Garments for his Consecration, that he may serve me in the Priests Office.* Faith therefore wherewith we believe, is the Work of the Spirit of God in that Sense, by which the Spirit of God giveth to one Man Wisdom and cunning in Workmanship more than another, and by which he effecteth also in other Points pertaining to our ordinary Life; that one Man believeth that, which, upon the same Grounds, another doth not; and one Man reverenceth the Opinion, and obeyeth the Commands of his Superiour, and others not.

10. And seeing our Faith, that the Scriptures are the Word of God, began from the Confidence and Trust we repose in the Church; there can be no Doubt but that their Interpretation of the same Scriptures (when any Doubt or Controversie shall arise, by which this Fundamental Point, *That Jesus Christ is come in the Flesh*, may be called in question) is safer for any Man to trust to, than his own, whether Reasoning or Spirit, that is to say, his own Opinion.

11. Now concerning Mens Affections to Godward, they are not the same always that are described in the Chapter concerning Passions. There, for to love, is to be delighted with the Image or Conception of the Thing loved; but God is unconceivable: To love God therefore, in the Scripture, is to obey his Commandments, and to love one another. Also to trust God, is different from our trusting one another;
for,

For, when a Man trusteth a Man, (Chap. 9. Sect. 8.) he layeth aside his own Endeavours: but if we do so in our Trust to God Almighty, we disobey him; and how shall we trust to him whom we know we disobey? To trust to God Almighty therefore, is to *resort* to his good Pleasure all that is above our own Power to effect: and this is all one with Acknowledging one only God, which is the first Commandment. And to trust in Christ, is no more but to acknowledge him for God; which is the fundamental Article of our Christian Faith: And consequently, to trust, rely, or, as some express it, to cast and roll our selves on Christ, is the same Thing with the Fundamental Point of Faith, namely, that *Jesus Christ is the Son of the living God.*

12. To honour God internally in the Heart, is the same Thing with that we ordinarily call Honour amongst Men: for it is nothing but the Acknowledging of his Power; and the Signs thereof, the same with the Signs of the Honour due to our Superiours, mentioned Chap. 8. Sect. 6. viz. to praise, to magnifie, to bless; to pray to him, to thank him, to give Oblations and Sacrifices to him, to give Attention to his Word, to speak to him in Prayer with Consideration, to come into his Presence with humble Gesture, and in decent Manner, and to adorn his Worship with Magnificence and Cost: and these are natural Signs of our honouring him internally: And therefore the Contrary hereof, To neglect prayer, to speak to him *extempore*, to come to Church slovenly, to adorn the Place of his Worship

ship worse than our own Houses, to take up his Name in every idle Discourse, are the manifest Signs of Contempt of the Divine Majesty. There be other Signs which are arbitrary; as, to be uncovered, (as we be here); to put off their Shooes, as *Moses* at the fiery Bush, and some other of that Kind, which in their own Nature are indifferent, till, to avoid Indecency and Discord, it be otherwise determined by common Consent.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

1. **I**T hath been declared already, how *external* Objects cause *Conceptions*, and *Conceptions*, *Appetite* and *Fear*, which are the *first unperceived Beginnings* of our *Actions*: for either the *Actions* immediately follow the first *Appetite*, as when we do any Thing upon a sudden; or else to our first *Appetite* there succeedeth some *Conception* of Evil to happen to us by such *Actions*, which is *Fear*, and which holdeth us from proceeding. And to that *Fear* may succeed a new *Appetite*, and to that *Appetite* another *Fear* alternately, till the *Action* be either done, or some *Accident* come between, to make it impossible; and so this alternate *Appetite* and *Fear* ceaseth. This *alternate Succession* of *Appetite* and *Fear* during all the time the *Action* is in our *Power* to do or not to do, is that we call *Deliberation*; which Name hath been given it for that Part of the *Definition* wherein it is said that it lasteth so long as the *Action*, whereof we deliberate, is in our *Power*: for, so long we have *Liberty* to do or not to do; and *Deliberation* signifieth a *Taking away* of our own *Liberty*.

2. *Deliberation* therefore requireth in the *Action* deliberated *two Conditions*; one, that it be *future*; the other, that there be *Hope* of doing it, or possibility of not doing it; for, *Appetite* and *Fear* are *Expectations* of the future; and there is no *Expectation* of

of Good, without Hope; or of Evil, without Possibility: of *Necessaries* therefore there is *no Deliberation*. In Deliberation, the last Appetite, as also the last Fear, is called *Will*, viz. the last Appetite, Will to do; or Will to omit. It is all one therefore to say *Will*, and *last Will*: for, though a Man expresses his present Inclination and Appetite concerning the disposing of his Goods, by Words or Writing; yet shall it not be counted his Will, because he hath still Liberty to dispose of them other ways: but when Death taketh away that Liberty, then it is his Will.

Mixed;
of

3. *Voluntary* Actions and Omissions are such as have Beginning in the *Will*; all other are *involuntary*, or ~~involuntary~~ *voluntary*, such as a Man doth upon Appetite or Fear; *involuntary*, such as he doth by Necessity of Nature, as when he is pushed, or falleth, and thereby doth Good or hurt to another: *mixt*, such as participate of both; as when a Man is carried to Prison, Going is voluntary, to the Prison, is involuntary: The Example of him that throweth his Goods out of a Ship into the Sea, to save his Person, is of an Action, altogether voluntary; for, there is nothing therein involuntary, but the Hardiness of the Choice, which is not his Action, but the Action of the Winds: what he himself doth, is no more against his Will, than to flee from Danger is against the Will of him that seeth no other Means to preserve himself.

4. *Voluntary* also are the Actions that proceed from sudden *Anger*, or other sudden *Appetite* in such Men as can discern Good or Evil: for, in them the Time precedent is to be judged Deliberation;

ration; for then also he deliberateth in what Cases it is good to *strike*, deride; or do any other Action proceeding from Anger or other such sudden Passion.

5. *Appetite*, *Fear*, *Hope*, and the rest of the Passions are not called *voluntary*; for they proceed not from, but are the *will*, and the *Will* is not *voluntary*: for, a Man can no more say he will will, than he will will will, and so make an infinite Repetition of the Word [*will*]; which is absurd, and insignificant.

6. Forasmuch as *Will to do* is *Appetite*, and *Will to omit*, *Fear*; the Cause of *Appetite* and *Fear* is the Cause also of our *will*: But the propounding of the Benefits and of Harms, that is to say, of Reward and Punishment, is the Cause of our *Appetite*, and of our *Fears*; and therefore also of our *Wills*, so far forth as we believe that such Rewards and Benefits as are propounded, shall arrive unto us; and consequently, our *wills* follow our *Opinions*, as our *Actions* follow our *Wills*; in which Sense they say truly, and properly, that say the World is governed by Opinion.

7. When the *Wills* of many concur to one and the same Action and Effect, this *Concourse* of their *wills* is called *Consent*; by which we must not understand one *Will* of many Men (for every Man hath his several *Will*) but many *Wills* to the producing of one Effect: But when the *wills* of two divers Men produce such Actions as are reciprocally *resistant* one to the other, this is called *Contention*; and, being upon the Persons one of another, *Battel*: whereas Actions proceeding from *Consent*, are mutual *Aid*.

G

8. When

8. When many Wills are involved or included in the Will of one or more consenting, (which how it may be, shall be hereafter declared) then is that involving of many Wills in one or more, called *Union*.

9. In *Deliberations* interrupted, as they may be by *Diversion* of other Business, or by *Sleep*, the last *Appetite* of such Part of the *Deliberation* is called *Intention*, or *Purpose*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

1. **H**AVING spoken of the Powers and Acts of the Mind, both cognitive and motive, considered in every Man by himself, without Relation to others; it will fall fitly into this Chapter, to speak of the Effects of the same Power one upon another; which Effects are also the Signs, by which one taketh notice what another conceiveth and intendeth. Of these Signs, some are such as cannot easily be counterfeited; as Actions and Gestures, especially if they be sudden, whereof I have mentioned some; (for Example, look in Chap. 9.) with the several Passions whereof they are Signs; Others there are which may be counterfeited; and those are Words or Speech; of the Use and Effects whereof, I am to speak in this Place.

2. The first Use of Language, is the expression of our Conceptions, that is, the begetting in one another the same Conceptions that we have in our selves; and this is called Teaching; wherein, if the Conception of him that teacheth continually accompany his Words, beginning at something true in Experience, then it begetteth the like Evidence in the Hearer that understandeth them, and maketh him to know something, which he is therefore said to learn: but if there be not such Evidence, then such teaching is called Perswasion, and begetteth no more in the Hear-

er, than what is in the Speakers bare *Opinion*. And the *Signs* of two *Opinions* contradictory one to another, namely, *Affirmation* and *Negation* of the same Thing, is called *Controversie*: but both *Affirmations*, or both *Negations*, *Consent in Opinion*.

3. The infallible Sign of teaching exactly, and without error, is this, that no Man hath ever taught the *Contrary*: Not that few, how few soever, if any; for commonly Truth is on the side of a few, rather than of the Multitude: But when in *Opinions* and *Questions* considered and discussed by many, it happeneth that not any one of the Men that so discuss'd them differ from another, then it may be justly inferred, they know what they teach, and that otherwise they do not. And this appears most manifestly to them that have considered the divers *Subjects* wherein they have exercised their Pens, and the divers *Ways* in which they have proceeded, together with the Diversity of the Success thereof: for, those Men who have taken in hand to consider nothing else but the Comparison of *Magnitudes*, *Numbers*, *Times*, and *Actions*, and how their *Proportions* are to one another, have thereby been the Authors of all those Excellencies by which we differ from such savage People as now inhabit divers places in *America*; and as have been the Inhabitants heretofore of those Countries where at this day Arts and Sciences do most flourish: for, from the Studies of these Men, have proceeded whatsoever cometh to us for Ornament by *Navigation*, and whatsoever we have beneficial

to humane Society by the *Division, Distinction,* and *Portraiting the Face of the Earth*; whatsoever also we have by the *Account of Times,* and *Foresight of the Course of Heaven*; whatsoever by *Measuring Distances, Plains, and Solids* of all Sorts; and whatsoever either *elegant or defensible in Building*: All which supposed a Way, what do we differ from the wildest of the *Indians*? Yet to this day was it never heard of, that there was any *Controversie* concerning any Conclusion in this Subject; the Science whereof hath nevertheless been continually amplified and enriched by the Conclusions of most difficult and profound Speculation. The *Reason* whereof is apparent to every Man that looketh into their Writings; for they proceed from most *low and humble Principles*, evident even to the meanest Capacity; going on *slowly*, and with most *scrupulous Ratiocination*; viz. from the Imposition of Names, they infer the Truth of their *first Propositions*; and from two of the first, a *third*; and from any two of the three, a *fourth*; and so on, according to the Steps of Science, mentioned Chap. 6. Sect. 4. On the other side, those Men who have written concerning the *Faculties, Passions, and Manners of Men*, that is to say; of *Moral Philosophy*, and of *Policy, Government, and Laws*, whereof there be infinite Volumes, have been so far from removing *Doubt and Controversie* in the Questions they have handled, that they have very much multiplied the same: Nor doth any Man at this day so much as pretend to know more than hath been delivered Two thousand Years ago by *Aristotle*:

and yet every Man thinks that in this Subject he knoweth as much as any other; supposing there needeth thereunto no Study but that acqueth unto them by natural Wit; though they play, or imploy, their Mind otherwise in the Purchase of Wealth or Place. The Reason whereof is no other, than that in their Writings and Discourses they take for Principles those Opinions which are already vulgarly received; whether true or false, being for the most part false. There is therefore a great deal of *Difference* between *Teaching* and *Perswading*; the Sign of *this* being *Controversie*; the Sign of the former, *no Controversie*.

4. There be two Sorts of Men that commonly be called *learned*: One is that Sort that proceedeth evidently from humble Principles, as is described in the last Section; and those Men are called *Mathematici*: The other are they that take up Maxims from their Education, and from the Authority of Men, or of Custom, and take the habitual Discourse of the Tongue for *Ratiocination*; and these are called *Dogmatici*. Now seeing in the last Section those we call *Mathematici* are absolved of the Crime of breeding Controversie, and they that pretend not to Learning cannot be accused, the Fault lieth altogether in the *Dogmaticks*, that is to say, those that are imperfectly learned, and with Passion press to have their Opinions pass every where for Truth, without any evident Demonstration either from Experience, or from Places of Scripture of uncontroverted Interpretation.

5. The Expression of those Conceptions which *cause* in us the *Experience* of Good while we deliberate; as also of those which *cause* our Expectation of Evil, is that which we call *Counselling*, and is the internal Deliberation of the Mind concerning what we our selves are to do or not to do. The *Consequences* of our Actions are our *Counsellors*, by *alternate Succession* in the Mind. So in the Counsel which a Man taketh from *other Men*, the *Counsellors* *alternately* do *make appear* the *Consequences* of the Action, and do not any of them deliberate, but furnish among them all, him that is counselled with Arguments whereupon to deliberate with himself.

6. Another Use of Speech is *Expression* of *Appetite*, *Intention*, and *Will*; as the *Appetite* of Knowledge by *Interrogation*; *Appetite* to have a Thing done by another, as *Request*, *Prayer*, *Petition*: *Expressions* of our Purpose or intention, as *Promise*, which is the Affirmation or Negation of some Action to be done in the future: *Threatning*, which is the Promise of Evil; and *Commanding*, which is that Speech by which we signify to another our *Appetite* or *Desire* to have any Thing done, or left undone, for Reasons contained in the Will it self: For it is not properly said, *Sic volo*, *sic jubeo*, without that other Clause, *Stet pro Ratione Voluntas*: And when the Command is a sufficient Reason to move us to Action, then is that Command called a *Law*.

7. Another Use of Speech is *Instigation* and *Appeasing*, by which we increase or diminish

one anothers Passion: It is the same Thing with *Perswasion*; the Difference not being real; for, the Begetting of *Opinion* and *Passion* is the same. But whereas in *Perswasion* we aim at Getting *Opinion* from *Passion*; here, the End is, to raise *Passion* from *Opinion*. And as in raising an *Opinion* from *Passion*, any *Premisses* are good enough to inforce the desired *Conclusion*; so, in raising *Passion* from *Opinion*, it is no matter whether the *Opinion* be true or false, or the *Narration* historical or fabulous: for, not the *Truth*, but the *Image*, maketh *Passion*: and a *Tragedy*, well acted, affecteth no less than a *Murther*.

8. Though words be the *Signs* we have of one anothers *Opinions* and *Intentions*, because the *Equivocation* of them is so frequent, according to the *Diversity* of *Contexture*, and of the *Company* wherewith they go, which, the *Presence* of him that speaketh, our *Sight* of his *Actions*, and *Conjecture* of his *Intentions*, must help to discharge us of; it must therefore be extream hard to find the *Opinions* and *Meaning* of those *Men* that are gone from us long ago, and have left us no other *Signification* thereof than their *Books*, which cannot possibly be understood without *History*, to discover those *forementioned* *Circumstances*, and also without great *Prudence* to observe them.

9. When it happeneth that a *Man* signifieth unto us two *contradictory* *Opinions*, whereof the one is clearly and directly signified, and the other either drawn from that by *Consequence*, or not known to be contradictory to it; then
(when

(when he is not present to explicate himself better) we are to take the *former* for his Opinion; for that is clearly signified to be his, and directly; whereas the other might proceed from error in the Deduction, or Ignorance of the Repugnancy. The like also is to be held in two contradictory Expressions of a Mans Intention and Will, for the same Reason.

10. Forasmuch as whosoever *speakes* to another, intendeth thereby to *make* him *understand* what he saith, if he speak unto him either in a Language which he that heareth understandeth not, or use any Word in other Sence than he believeth is the Sence of him that heareth, he *intendeth also not* to make him *understand* what he saith; which is a *Contradiction* of himself. It is therefore always to be supposed, that he which intendeth not to deceive, alloweth the private Interpretation of his Speech to him to whom it is addressed.

11. *Silence*, in him that *believeth* that the same shall be taken for a *Sign of his Intent*, is a Sign thereof indeed: for, if he did not consent, the Labour of *Speaking* *to much* as to declare the same, is so little, as it is to be presumed he would have done it.

(when he is not present to explicate himself
better) we are to take the former for his Op-
inion: for that is clearly assigned to be his, and
directly; whereas the other might proceed
from error in the Deduction, or Ignorance of
the Reasoning. The life also is to be held in
the same manner.

CONCLUSION.

THUS have we considered the Nature
of Man so far as was requisite for the
finding out the first and most simple Elements
wherein the Compositions of Politick Rules and
Laws are lastly resolved; which was my present
Purpose.

It is therefore always to
be intended, that the which intended not
to deceive although the private Interpreter
of the Speech to him to whom it is ad-
dressed.

It is shown in him that between that the same
shall be taken for a sign of his Law, is a sign there-
of indeed: for if it be not constant, the Law
is not of Speech, and therefore the same
is to hold, as it is to be intended he would have
done it.

FINIS.

